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In the first essay, I examine the association between auditor industry specialization and 
earnings management choices.  Prior research suggests that industry specialist auditors 
constrain accounting-based earnings management.  But such actions may cause client 
companies to seek alternative means to manage earnings.  Specifically, companies that 
hire industry specialist auditors may alter operating decisions to meet earnings targets, 
referred to as real activities manipulation.  This essay investigates whether clients of 
industry specialist auditors that have an incentive to manage earnings are constrained 
from managing earnings through accruals manipulation and, therefore, are more likely to 
engage in real activities manipulation.  Further, I examine whether operating performance 
declines for firms suspected of real activities manipulation.  My findings indicate that 
clients of industry specialist auditors with incentives to manage earnings have lower 
absolute value of accruals relative to firms with incentives to manage earnings that do not 
hire industry specialist auditors.  These clients of industry specialist auditors are also 
more likely to engage in real activities manipulation, suggesting this is a possible 
unintended consequence of hiring an industry specialist auditor.  I also document 
evidence that firms suspected of real activities manipulation have lower future operating 
performance relative to firms not suspected of real activities manipulation.              
 
In the second essay, I examine the association between the tightness of accounting 
standards and earnings management choices.  Prior studies suggest that managers switch 
from accounting-based earnings management to real activities manipulation in response 
 xii 
to tightening accounting standards.  My study investigates this line of reasoning.  I 
develop an analytical model and conduct an experimental examination of the effect of 
flexibility of accounting standards under different institutional environments.  I find that 
managers switch from accounting-based earnings management to real activities 
manipulation with tightening accounting standards only when the institutional investors 
have a short-term investment horizon.  In contrast, when managers are monitored by 













Healy and Wahlen (1999) document two forms of earnings management.  The first form 
involves choosing appropriate accounting methods to reach desired levels of earnings 
(i.e., accounting-based earnings management), and the second uses the timing and/or 
magnitude of operating decisions to reach desired earnings (i.e., real activities 
manipulation).  The former is relatively transparent in the year of the change; it may be 
flagged by the auditor in a public way and may receive footnote disclosure.  The latter, 
which, merely contributes to operating decisions, may be harder for an outsider to 
observe (Schipper 1989) and is unlikely to be judged to be violations of securities law. 
 
A body of literature (e.g., Maletta and Wright 1996; Solomon et al. 1999; Krishnan 2003) 
shows that industry specialist auditors have the abilities and incentives to detect and 
constrain accounting-based earnings management and, thus, enhance the quality of 
earnings.1  My paper follows this line of reasoning, but extends to earnings management 
that encompasses real activities manipulation.  Most prior studies that investigate the 
effect of auditor industry specialization (e.g., Krishnan 2003) focus on the opportunistic 
use of accruals to window-dress financial statements, and, for the most part, do not 
                                                 
 
 
1 Earnings increases that are accompanied by high accruals, suggest low-quality earnings. 
 2 
consider that firms may alter operating decisions to meet earnings targets.  In contrast, 
my study builds on the definition of earnings management discussed by Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) and focuses on how an industry specialist auditor affects a client’s 
choices of two earnings management vehicles:  earnings management through changing 
operating decisions (i.e., real activities manipulation) and through manipulating 
accounting accruals (i.e., accounting-based earnings management).  This paper 
contributes to the body of literature on the effects of auditor industry specialization on 
earnings management through changing operating activities.  It also adds to the literature 
on the consequences of such behaviors. 
 
I investigate whether the constraint imposed by an industry specialist auditor on 
accounting-based earnings management indirectly increases real activities manipulation.  
When the manager’s ability to employ accounting-based earnings management is limited, 
only real activities are available to manipulate earnings.  Hence, the fact that an industry 
specialist auditor constrains accounting-based earnings management may force firms to 
switch to real activities manipulation if the firm faces a strong incentive 2  to adjust 
earnings.  Further, I investigate whether real activities manipulation is harmful in the long 
run.  Real activities manipulation is accomplished by a wide variety of operating 
decisions.  These operating decisions may be suboptimal and weaken the firms’ operating 
performance in the long run.  For example, price discounts offered to boost current year 
earnings may lead to lower cash inflows in the future.  I examine the association between 
real activities manipulation and the firms’ long-run operating performance. 
                                                 
 
 
2 Incentives may come from managers’ compensation contracts and/or investment incentives.   
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I find that the clients of industry specialist auditors with strong incentives to manage 
earnings have lower accounting-based earnings management and higher real activities 
manipulation.  The results suggest that as auditors’ market share increases, clients use 
less accounting-based earnings management and more real activities manipulation to 
achieve earnings targets.  Moreover, I provide some evidence that firms engaged in real 
activities manipulation produces lower operating performance in future years relative to 
the matched firm not engaged in real activities manipulation. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 discusses the motivation 
for firms to hire industry specialist auditors, how such decisions can impact managers’ 
earnings management behaviors and the consequences of such behaviors.  Further, I 
develop the testable hypotheses.  Section 1.3 describes how to measure auditor industry 
specialization and real activities manipulation, as well as the sample selection procedure 
and descriptive statistics.  Section 1.4 provides the estimation models and empirical 
results for the association between auditor industry specialization and real activities 
manipulation.  Section 1.5 documents the methodology for testing the consequences of 
real activities manipulation and presents the results.  Section 1.6 offers concluding 
remarks. 
 
1.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
1.2.1 Motives to Hire Industry Specialist Auditors 
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Research on the demand for quality-differentiated audits has drawn on the agency and 
contracting literature.  The argument is that as agency costs increase, a demand for higher 
quality audits arises, either voluntarily undertaken by managers as a bonding mechanism 
or externally imposed as a monitoring mechanism by stockholders and/or debtholders 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  The demand for auditing in general, and for quality-
differentiated auditing in particular, is assumed to be the efficient resolution of costly 
contracting problems.   
 
Industry specialization undoubtedly affects the nature of auditing experience and the 
development of expertise, which may permit individual specialists to better identify and 
address industry specific problems and issues (Solomon and Shields 1995).  An increase 
in industry expertise at the individual level is correlated with an increase in industry 
expertise at the firm level.  Benefits at the audit-firm level accrue because industry 
specialization facilitates the transfer of learned knowledge and developed technology 
from one client to other similar clients.  Therefore, industry specialist auditors are 
expected to provide higher quality audits than non-specialists. 
 
Two main factors may influence clients’ decisions to hire auditors with industry 
specialization.  One factor is the complexity of client operations—companies with 
complex operations are more likely to hire industry specialist auditors because many 
operations are related to unique features of the industry.  Industry specialists are capable 
of providing a cost-efficient audit for such companies.   
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A second factor is a firm’s intent to seek additional financing either from the credit or 
equity markets.  For example, debt contracts are usually written with financial covenants 
such that the borrower must maintain certain financial ratios.  Creditors may feel more 
confident in making loans to firms if the numbers used to monitor the loan are audited by 
industry specialist auditors.  In addition, the company that plans to tap the capital markets 
is likely to choose an industry specialist auditor as a means of convincing capital 
suppliers that the firm’s earnings quality is high.   
 
1.2.2 The Impact of Auditor Industry Specialization on Earnings Quality 
Prior research suggests that auditor industry specialization 3  constrains earnings 
management through pure accruals manipulation.  Krishnan (2003) examines the 
association between auditor industry expertise and a client’s level of absolute 
discretionary accruals.  He finds that clients of non-specialist auditors report absolute 
discretionary accruals that are, on average, 1.2 percent of total assets higher than the 
discretionary accruals reported by clients of specialist auditors.   
 
Balsam et al. (2003) compare discretionary accruals (DAC) and earnings response 
coefficients 4  (ERC) of firms audited by industry specialists with those of firms not 
audited by industry specialists.  They find clients of industry specialist auditors have 
lower DAC and higher ERC than clients of non-specialist auditors.   
 
                                                 
 
 
3 Industry specialists can be measured in terms of both auditor market share in an industry and the industry 
share in the auditor’s portfolio of client industries. 
4 The earnings response coefficient indicates the investors’ response to an earnings surprise and reflects a 
user’s view of financial reporting credibility.  The intuition underlying this line of research is that an 
earnings surprise will result in a greater stock price reaction when investors perceive the reported earnings 
to be more informative. 
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Francis et al. (2004) examine the association between earnings quality and auditor 
industry leadership at the city-specific level.  They define earnings quality as the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals and the likelihood of meeting or just beating analysts’ 
earnings forecast.  Earnings quality is judged to be lower if abnormal accruals are larger, 
or if firms are more likely to manipulate reported earnings to meet or beat forecasted 
earnings targets.  They report that earnings quality is higher when the auditor is the city-
specific industry leader.   
 
The extant evidence suggests that industry specialist auditors constrain accounting-based 
earnings management.  However, managers still have incentives to adjust earnings to 
maximize their wealth.  These incentives are created by contracts that are “explicitly” 
based on reported earnings (e.g., management compensation plans and debt agreements); 
contracts that are “implicitly” based on reported earnings (e.g., implicit contracts between 
the firm and its customers and suppliers); and specific situations (such as import relief 
negotiations, and management buyouts) where reported earnings also play an important 
role (Becker et al. 1998).  Therefore, the constraints of accruals-based manipulation from 
industry specialist auditors may motivate managers to alter real activities during the year 
with the specific objective of meeting earnings targets.   
 
Hypothesis 1a: Clients of industry specialist auditors with incentives to manage 
earnings are constrained to engage in accounting-based earnings 
management by their auditors. 
 
 7 
Hypothesis 1b: The constraints of accounting-based earnings management 
imposed by industry specialist auditors indirectly increase the 
clients with incentives to manage earnings to switch to real 
activities manipulation. 
 
1.2.3 Consequences of Real Activities Manipulation 
Schipper (1989) defines earnings management as the purposeful intervention in the 
external financial reporting process with the intent of obtaining some private gain.  The 
desire to achieve a high stock price and/or to meet the earnings benchmark induces 
corporate managers to engage in earnings management, inflating current earnings at the 
expense of the firms’ economic values.5   
 
To meet a certain earnings target, managers can wait until the year-end to use 
discretionary accruals to manage reported earnings.  But this strategy runs the risk that 
the amount of earnings that needs to be manipulated is greater than the available 
discretionary accruals because the discretion on accruals is bounded by GAAP (Barton 
and Simko 2002).  Given the underlying economic transactions of a firm, manager’s 
ability to report accrued earnings is limited.  As a result, the earnings target may not be 
                                                 
 
 
5 Although managers themselves, as well as policy makers and members of the media, have voiced concern 
over this issue, many academics dismiss these worries as unfounded.  The argument (e.g., Jensen 1986) is 
based on the tenet of efficient markets.  Because it is unlikely that the market can be systematically fooled 
by inflated earnings, managers who undertake actions that are not in the best long-run interests of their 
companies will see stock price suffer.  Hence, managers who are concerned with high stock prices will not 
sacrifice long-run performance to inflate current earnings.  However, Stein (1989) argues that even a fully 
efficient market can lead managers to behave myopically.  The situation is analogous to the prisoner’s 
dilemma.  The preferred cooperative equilibrium would involve no myopia on the part of managers and no 
conjecture of myopia by the stock market.  Unfortunately, this cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium.  
If the market conjectures no myopia, managers will have an incentive to fool it by boosting current 
earnings. 
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reached using discretionary accruals at year end.  Managers can reduce this risk by 
manipulating real operating activities during the year.  Real activities manipulations are 
less subject to this constraint.  Another advantage of altering real activities to manipulate 
earnings is that auditors and regulators are less likely to be concerned with such 
behaviors.6  However, real activities manipulation is costly, including the possibility that 
cash flows in future periods are affected negatively by the actions taken currently to 
increase earnings.   
 
If a manager engages in real activities manipulation and deviates from the optimal level 
of operating activities, long run economic consequences may arise.  Stein (1989) shows 
that, in the face of a rational stock market, managers sacrifice total cash flows to boost 
near-term income in an effort to influence the market's current assessment of the firm's 
value.  Along similar lines, Jensen and Murphy (1990) point out that on average, CEOs 
enjoyed a $3 rise in their own wealth for every $1000 decrease in shareholders’ wealth.  
An implication of their finding is that a CEO might choose to undertake a project that 
would cost shareholders $1.00 but bring $0.003 in private benefits.   
 
Most evidence on real activities manipulation centers on the opportunistic reduction of 
discretionary expenses such as R&D expenses (e.g., Bushee 1998; Baber et al. 1991).  
Although cutting these discretionary expenses can boost earnings to meet certain targets, 
                                                 
 
 
6 The rise of accounting-based earnings management in recent years has prompted calls for reforms to 
restore investor confidence in reported accounting information.  Regulators and standard setters make every 
effort to improve the transparency of financial statements and to enhance the monitoring mechanisms of 
discretionary accruals.   
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it entails the risk of lower future cash flow from operations (CFO) because this action 
generally reduces cash outflows and, in turn, has a positive effect on current CFO.  In the 
subsequent years, this positive effect may be reversed.   
 
Thomas and Zhang (2002) provide evidence on real activities manipulation through 
overproduction.  That is, managers produce more than the quantity required to meet sales 
and normal target inventory levels to decrease reported COGS, resulting in increases in 
reported earnings.  Although it improves the profitability margin, the firm incurs costs 
and lower than normal CFO.   
 
The recent study (i.e., Roychowdhury 2006) finds that managers offer price discounts to 
boost sales.  Managers provide deep discounts towards fiscal year end to increase sales.  
The increased sales volume that is generated is likely to disappear when the firm re-
establishes the old prices.  This action, in fact, moves the future profitability to the 
current period.  As a result, the future profitability may be harmed by sales management.   
 
In all, a firm is typically harmed when managers manipulate earnings through real 
activities.  First, when managers manipulate earnings to meet earnings targets, contracts 
require firms to deliver larger financial rewards to these managers.  Second, the time and 
effort managers devote to manipulation are often time and effort they might otherwise 
devote to productive activities.  Third, Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) have shown that the 
possibility of manipulating real activities has real economic costs.  That is, companies 
might not pursue efficient projects to maximize the firm’s value.  It is corroborated by 
Bhojraj and Libby’s (2005) experimental study, which suggests that managers more often 
choose projects that they believe will maximize short-term earnings (and price) as opposed to 
 10 
total cash flows in response to increased capital market pressure.  Although prior studies 
suggest that managers will sacrifice long-term performance if they have an incentive to 
adjust near-term earnings, little research directly tests this issue empirically.  Hence, in 
the second hypothesis, I examine whether real activities manipulation affects firms’ 
future performances.  Specifically, I investigate the extent to which subsequent operating 
performance is affected by real activities manipulation. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Firms with incentives to hire a specialist and to engage in earnings 
management undertake real activities manipulation, lowering 
future operating performance. 
 
1.3Measurement of Auditor Industry Specialization and Real Activities 
Manipulation and Sample Selection 
 
1.3.1 Measures of Auditor Industry Specialization 
Market share7 and portfolio share8 approaches are frequently used as proxies for auditor 
industry specialization.  Hogan and Jeter (1999) find evidence of an unstable relationship 
between market share and portfolio approaches.  They report a positive relation between 
these two measures for two firms, a negative relation for two firms, and no relation for 
                                                 
 
 
7 The market share approach defines an industry specialist as an audit firm that has differentiated itself from 
its competitors in terms of market share within a particular industry.  This approach assumes that by 
observing the relative market shares of the accounting firms serving a particular industry, one can deduce 
industry specific knowledge.  The firm with the largest market share has developed the largest knowledge 
base within the particular industry.  Moreover, significant market share within an industry reflects 
significant investment by audit firms in developing industry-specific audit technologies, with the expected 
benefits being increased economies of scale and improved audit quality. 
8  The portfolio share approach considers the relative distribution of audit services across the various 
industries for each audit firm.  This approach is related more to audit firm strategies.  The audit firm’s 
client industries with the largest portfolio shares reflect industries where the audit firms have developed 
significant knowledge bases and large portfolio shares reflect significant investments by audit firms in 
developing industry audit technologies.  Using this approach, firms presumably have devoted the most 
resources into developing industry-specific knowledge, even if they do not maintain a leading market share 
in that industry.  In this sense, the portfolio share approach measures the auditor’s self-identified market 
specialization, but not the relative advantage over other auditors. 
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one firm.  Little research provides justification on which method is more appropriate to 
use as a proxy for auditor industry specialization.   
 
In this paper, I use market share as a proxy for auditor industry specialization because it 
represents industry superiority over other auditors.  The higher the market share, the more 
industry expertise and experience the auditor has relative to its competitors.  Having high 
market share (dominant market share) also implies that the auditor successfully 
differentiates itself from competitors in terms of audit quality (Mayhew and Wilkins 
2002).9   
 
Auditors market shares are computed as follows: auditors market share = sum of assets of 
all clients of a particular audit firm in a certain industry / total assets of clients in this 
industry.10  Following Palmrose (1986), I designate audit firms as industry specialists if 
they have within-industry market shares in excess of (1 firm/N firms * 1.20) %.  The 
Palmrose measure modified for the big auditors seems to capture the spirit of 
differentiation (Neal and Riley 2004).   
 
1.3.2 Measures of Real Activities Manipulation 
                                                 
 
 
9 In contrast, an auditor with a high portfolio share in an industry is not necessarily an industry specialist 
auditor.  For instance, in an extreme case, a small auditor with a very high portfolio share in a certain 
industry is very likely not an industry specialist compared to its competitors (e.g., other Big N auditors).  It 
indicates that this auditor is not an industry expert relative to others although it spends a large amount of 
resources on developing a high portfolio share in that industry.   
10 The auditor’s industry share in each two-digit SIC code is computed using the population of available 
observations comprising only Big N auditors from COMPUSTAT for each year.   
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 Following the prior studies on real activities manipulation (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006; 
Gunny 2005; Zang 2005), I examine the following real activities manipulation: sales 
manipulation, reduction of discretionary expenditures, and overproduction.  I measure the 
abnormal level of each type of real activities manipulation as the residual from the 
relevant estimation model.   
 
Roychowdhury (2006) defines sales manipulation as managers’ attempts to temporarily 
increase sales during the year by offering price discounts or more lenient credit terms, 
which lowers the cash inflow per sale.  Hence, sales manipulation is expected to lead to 
lower current-period CFO.  I use Roychowdhury’s (2006) model to estimate the normal 
level of CFO: 
1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1/ *(1/ ) ( / ) ( / )t t t t t t t tCFO A A S A S Aα α β β ε− − − −= + + + ∆ +    
 
where  CFO= Cash flow from operations;  
  S = Net sales; 
  A= Total assets. 
 
This model is developed based on Dechow et al. (1998).  The normal level of CFO is 
expressed as a linear function of sales and change in sales.  For every firm-year, 
abnormal cash flow from operations (ABCFO) is the difference between the actual CFO 
and the expected CFO calculated using the corresponding industry-year model.   
 
Another type of real activities manipulation is the reduction of discretionary expenses.  If 
managers reduce discretionary expenditures (e.g., R&D, advertising, and SG&A 
expenses) to boost earnings to the targets, abnormally low discretionary expenses are 
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expected.  Following Roychowdhury (2006), I estimate the normal level of discretionary 
expenses using the equation below: 
1 0 1 1 1 1/ *(1/ ) ( / )t t t t t tEXP A A S Aα α β ε− − − −= + + +      
 
where  EXP = Discretionary expenses = R&D + Advertising + Selling, General  
  and Administrative expenses; 
  S = Net sales; 
  A= Total assets. 
 
Roychowdhury (2006) develops this model under the assumptions in Dechow et al. 
(1998) and assumes that discretionary expenditures are a linear function of sales.  For 
every firm-year, abnormal discretionary expenditure (ABEXP) is the difference between 
the actual discretionary expenses and the expected discretionary expenses calculated 
using the corresponding industry-year model.11   
 
The third type of real activities manipulation is to produce more goods than necessary to 
meet expected demand (i.e., overproduction).  Overproduction reduces cost of goods sold 
(COGS), which results in higher operating margin.  However, additional holding and 
production costs may be incurred and are very likely to increase marginal costs, which 
results in higher annual production costs relative to sales.  I use Roychowdhury’s (2006) 
model to estimate the normal level of production costs: 
1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 1/ *(1/ ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )t t t t t t t t t tPROD A A S A S A S Aα α β β β ε− − − − − −= + + + ∆ + ∆ +  
 
where   PROD = Production costs = COGS + Inventory; 
  S = Net sales; 
                                                 
 
 
11 I also break down the discretionary expenses.  Specifically, I examine the discretionary R&D expenses 
and discretionary SG&A expenses.  Zang’s (2005) models are used to calculate the abnormal R&D 
expenses and the abnormal SG&A expenses.  
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  St = St – St-1. 
This model is based on Dechow et al. (1998).  The paper find that COGS and changes in 
inventory are associated with sales and changes in sales.  For every firm-year, abnormal 
production cost (ABPROD) is the difference between the actual production costs and the 
expected production costs calculated using the corresponding industry-year model.   
 
1.3.3 Sample Selection 
My tests employ data from two sources.  Financial data is obtained from COMPUSTAT.  
Analyst forecast data is obtained from the I/B/E/S summary file.  I study the sample 
period from 1989 to 2004.  Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Krishnan 2003), I 
exclude the financial services industry (SIC 6000-6999) and the utilities industry (SIC 
4400-5000) to improve the comparability of results among sample firms.  My sample is 
constrained to Big N auditors to eliminate brand name effect.  In addition, I require at 
least 15 observations for each industry-year grouping to ensure there are sufficient data to 
compute each proxy for earnings management (e.g., ABDAC and ABCFO).   
 
My tests are conducted based on the firms that have incentives to manipulate earnings.  
Specifically, I focus on the two groups of firms that are well identified by the prior 
literature as the firms with strong incentives to manage earnings: (1) firms that just meet 
analysts’ forecasts and (2) firms that are issuing new equities.12   
                                                 
 
 
12 Healy and Wahlen (1999) show that the capital market provides the major incentive for managers to 
manipulate reported earnings in an attempt to influence short-term stock prices.  Many recent studies focus 
on two types of capital market incentives: meeting earnings benchmark (e.g., analyst consensus estimate) 
and issuing new equities.  For example, Burgstahler and Eames (1998) find that firms manage earnings to 
meet analysts’ forecasts.  Teoh et al. (1998) present evidence that earnings management occurs before the 
issuance of new equities. 
 15 
 
I form the sample that includes firms that just meet analysts’ forecasts consistent with 
Dechow et al. (2000).  Forecast errors (FE) are computed by subtracting forecast 
earnings13 from realized earnings reported by I/B/E/S.   The benchmark beater class 
includes all firm-years that exactly meet the consensus analysts’ forecasts.  The equity 
issuance group includes the firms that are going to issue new equities in the next year.  If 
the firm issues new equity in the current year, I identify the firm in the past year as the 
firm-year that the managers have strong incentives to manipulate earnings. 
 
1.3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.1 reports the descriptive statistics for sample firms that just meet the analysts’ 
forecasts.  Seven hundred and twenty-five of 2,190 firms (33%) are audited by specialist 
auditors.  The results of Table 1.1 indicate that clients of specialist auditors are larger, 
and have lower market-to-book ratio than clients of non-specialist auditors.  More 
important, clients of specialist auditors report lower ABDAC, lower ABCFO, lower 
ABEXP 14 , and higher ABPROD than clients of non-specialist auditors.  Table 1.2 
documents the descriptive statistics for firms before new equity issuance.15  It shows that 
clients of industry specialist auditors are generally larger and have lower ABDAC and 
                                                 
 
 
13 I use the most recent median I/B/E/S forecasts of annual earnings for the current year as forecast 
earnings.   
14  The result is not significant for ABEXP.  I also examine the two specific kinds of discretionary 
expenditures (i.e., R&D expenses and SG&A expenses).  Generally, clients of industry specialist auditors 
and clients of non-specialists have the same level of ABRD and ABSGA.   
15 The final sample size is 23,079.  Six thousand six hundred and thirty-seven firm-years (29%) are audited 
by industry specialist auditors. 
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higher ABPROD than clients of non-specialists.16  The descriptive statistics from both 
samples are consistent with Hypothesis 1a that industry specialist auditors constrain 
accounting-based earnings management.  The results also support Hypothesis 1b, 
showing that clients of industry specialists have more real activities manipulation.   
 
                                                 
 
 
16 ABCFO and ABEXP are not significantly different between clients of specialist auditors and clients of 
non-specialists. 
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics on Companies Audited by Industry Specialist Auditors 
and Non-specialist Auditors (Firms that just meet analysts’ forecasts) 
 Specialist 
 


















































































*** significant at the 1% level ** significant at the 5% level        *significant at 
the 10% level 
Two-tailed. 
 




Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics on Companies Audited by Industry Specialist Auditors 
and Non-specialist Auditors (Firm-years before New Equity Issuance) 
 Specialist 
 

















































































*** significant at the 1% level ** significant at the 5% level        *significant at 
the 10% level 
Two-tailed. 
 




1.4 Research Method and Empirical Results for Hypothesis 1 
1.4.1 Research Method for Testing Hypothesis 1a 
Hypothesis 1a predicts that industry specialist auditors constrain clients’ abilities to use 
accounting-based earnings management to manipulate earnings.  It has been addressed in 
the prior literature, but I am confirming the results using my samples (i.e., firms with 
strong incentives to manage earnings).  Consistent with the prior studies, I use both a 
dichotomous and a continuous measure of auditor industry specialization.  Clients of 
industry specialist auditors (SPEL) are expected to have lower ABDAC.  In the 
regression with the continuous measure for auditor industry specialization, a non-linear 
relation between auditor’s market share and ABDAC is examined.  Both auditor’s market 
share (Mktshare) and its squared term (Mktsharesq) are included because Balsam et al. 
(2003) find a non-linear relationship between the auditor’s industry specialization and 
earnings quality.  Their findings are consistent with the notion that benefits to auditor 
industry specialization begin only after the auditor achieves a certain threshold level of 
industry knowledge.  Hence, I predict a positive sign on Mktshare and a negative sign on 
Mktsharesq.  The following regressions are adopted to test Hypothesis 1a: 
 
tttttt SPELNIMTBSIZEABDAC µβββββ +×+×+×+×+= 43210  




To control for size effects, size (SIZE) defined as the natural logarithm of total assets is 
included.  I expect a negative sign on SIZE because large firms are more likely to be 
“value firms” which are shown to have lower accruals.  The logarithm of market-to-book 
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ratio (MTB) is included to control for growth opportunities and/or the life cycle of the 
firm.  Firms with high MTB are typically growth firms which have higher accruals.  So a 
positive sign is expected on MTB.  I also include net income scaled by market value (NI) 
as a control variable for a firm’s profitability.   
 
Research documents that clients of industry specialist auditors have higher earnings 
quality.  Higher earnings quality can be represented by lower level of absolute value of 
discretionary accruals.  That is, clients of industry specialist auditors have less discretion 
on accruals, consistent with Krishnan (2003) and Balsam et al. (2003).  Both studies 
suggest that industry specialist auditors constrain both high discretionary accruals and 
low discretionary accruals.  Hence, the absolute value of discretionary accruals is used in 
my study.  The absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABDAC) represents accounting-
based earnings management.  ABDAC is determined using the cross-sectional version of 
the Jones (1991) model.17   
 
1.4.2 Empirical Results of Hypothesis 1a from the First Sample (Firms that Just 
Meet Analysts’ Forecasts) 
 
I test the Hypothesis 1a with sample firms that just meet analysts’ forecasts.  Table 1.3 
documents the results of the regressions of ABDAC on auditor industry specialization 
                                                 
 
 
17 I use the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a proxy for accounting-based earnings management. 
ACCRt/At-1 =  * (1/At-1) + 1 * (St/At-1) + 2 * (PPEt/At-1) + t 
where At-1 is the total assets at the end of the prior period, St is the change in sales over last period’s sales 
and PPEt denotes property, plant and equipment.  This equation is estimated for every industry and year.  
ACCRt is the total accruals for each firm in year t. 
The model is estimated separately for each combination of two-digit SIC codes and calendar years.  Fitted 
values are defined as expected accruals.  The error term in the model represents the unexplained or 
discretionary component of accruals. 
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measured by both a continuous variable and a dichotomous variable.  The results indicate 
that clients of industry specialist auditors have lower ABDAC.  In addition, the results 
show that Mktshare and Mktsharesq have positive and negative coefficients, respectively.  
This finding is consistent with prior study that threshold levels of industry knowledge 
must be reached before benefits accrue.  In general, the findings are consistent with the 
notion that industry specialist auditors mitigate accounting-based earnings management 
more than non-specialist auditors.   
 
Table 1.3: The OLS Regression of Absolute Abnormal Discretionary Accruals on 
Industry Specialist Auditors over 1989-2004 (Firms that just meet analysts’ forecasts) 
 
tttttt SPELNIMTBSIZEABDAC µβββββ +×+×+×+×+= 43210  








Coefficients t value Coefficients t value 
Intercept ? 0.3172 9.18*** 0.1457 3.44*** 
SIZE - -0.0104 -1.91** -0.0131 -2.37*** 
MTB + 0.0533 3.98*** 0.0525 3.96*** 
NI ? -0.1321 -7.07*** -0.1260 -6.81*** 
Mktshare +   1.8299 6.77*** 
Mktsharesq -   -3.4014 -6.82*** 
SPEL - -0.0374 -1.70**   
Adjusted R2 
(%) 
 2.97  4.88  
*** significant at the 1% level ** significant at the 5% level        *significant at the 
10% level  
One- tailed where signs are predicted, two-tailed otherwise. 
 
For variable definitions, refer to Appendix A.  
 
1.4.3 Empirical Results of Hypothesis 1a from the Second Sample (Firm-years 
before New Equity Issuance) 
 
I test Hypothesis 1a using the sample including firm-years that are issuing new equities.  
The results are generally consistent with those in the first sample (i.e., firms that just meet 
analysts’ forecasts).  Table 1.4 presents the results from the regression of ABDAC on 
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auditor industry specialization.  The results are consistent with both Hypothesis 1a and 
the results in the first sample that industry specialist auditors constrain accounting-based 
earnings management.   
 
Table 1.4: The OLS Regression of Absolute Abnormal Discretionary Accruals on 
Industry Specialist Auditors over 1989-2004 (Firm-years before New Equity Issuance) 
 
tttttt SPELNIMTBSIZEABDAC µβββββ +×+×+×+×+= 43210  








Coefficients t value Coefficients t value 
Intercept ? 0.2803 34.10*** 0.2351 25.55*** 
SIZE - -0.0104 -7.27*** -0.0152 -10.23*** 
MTB + 0.0411 12.74*** 0.0405 12.60*** 
NI ? -0.0000 -1.15 -0.0000 -1.06 
Mktshare +   0.6975 10.29*** 
Mktsharesq -   -1.2116 -9.20*** 
SPEL - -0.0157 -2.40***   
Adjusted R2 
(%) 
 1.05  1.50  
*** significant at the 1% level ** significant at the 5% level        *significant at the 
10% level  
One- tailed where signs are predicted, two-tailed otherwise. 
 
For variable definitions, refer to Appendix A.  
 
1.4.4 Research Method for Testing Hypothesis 1b 
Hypothesis 1b predicts that the constraints of accounting-based earnings management 
result in clients of the industry specialists engaging in more real activities manipulations.  
The OLS regression is not appropriate to test Hypothesis 1b.  One of the central 
methodological issues in the OLS regression is the endogenous character of the abnormal 
discretionary accruals: it is true that the abnormal discretionary accruals can be seen as a 
key input for the abnormal cash flow from operations, but it is necessary to recognize that 
the abnormal discretionary accruals is determined to a large extent by the abnormal cash 
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flow from operations.  Therefore, instrumental variables (IV) estimation is used due to 
endogeneity of the abnormal discretionary accruals.   
 
I include two IVs (i.e., auditor’s market share in a certain industry and its squared term) 
in the model.  Since more than one than instruments are selected, various tests for the 
validity of the instruments and the quality of fit can be performed within this framework.  
The following two stage least squares (2SLS) regressions are used to test Hypothesis 1b: 
 
First Stage:  




Second Stage (Sales Manipulation):  
tttttt ABDACNIMTBSIZEABCFO µβββββ +×+×+×+×+= 43210    
 
Second Stage (Reduction of Discretionary Accruals):  
tttttt ABDACNIMTBSIZEABEXP µβββββ +×+×+×+×+= 43210    
 
Second Stage (Overproduction):  
tttttt ABDACNIMTBSIZEABPROD µβββββ +×+×+×+×+= 43210      
 
Building on the finding from Hypothesis 1a that industry specialist auditors constrain 
accounting-based earnings management, Hypothesis 1b predicts that such constraints 
force firms with strong incentives to manage earnings to switch to real activities 
manipulation.  Thus, lower ABDAC is expected to be associated with lower ABCFO, 
lower ABEXP, and/or higher ABPROD in the second stage.18  
                                                 
 
 
18  In addition, I adopt the following OLS regressions to directly test the association between auditor 
industry specialization (both a continuous and a dichotomous variables are examined) and real activities 
manipulation.   
tttttttt SPELNIMTBSIZEABPRODABEXPABCFO µβββββ +×+×+×+×+= 43210//





1.4.5 Empirical Results of Hypothesis 1b from the First Sample (Firms that Just 
Meet Analysts’ Forecasts) 
 
Table 1.5 presents the results from the estimation of the second stage of 2SLS.19  Three 
separate models are reported for each type of real activities manipulation.  I find that 
ABDAC is positively and significantly associated with ABCFO and ABEXP.  The results 
suggest that the constraints of accounting-based earnings management increase real 
activities manipulation such as sales manipulation and reduction of discretionary 
expenses, when firms face a strong incentive to meet analysts’ forecasts.20   
 
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
If the constraints of industry specialist auditors on ABDAC force the firms to engage in real activities 
manipulation, clients of industry specialist auditors with strong incentives to manage earnings are expected 
to show lower ABCFO, lower ABEXP, and/or higher ABPROD.  Moreover, I investigate the non-linear 
relation between auditors’ market shares and real activities manipulation.  If accounting-based earnings 
management and real activities manipulation have a substitution effect, auditors’ market shares are 
expected to have a concave (convex) relation with ABCFO and/or ABEXP (ABPROD) because the 
association between auditors’ market shares and ABDAC is a concave function.   
19 A test for relevance of the instrument is conducted using the Anderson Canonical correlations LR test of 
whether the equation is identified.  The test is a check of the excluded instrument (the exogenous variable 
not included in the second stage regression).  The instrument variable here is the auditor market share.  The 
test statistic is a measure of the instrument relevance, so a rejection of the null indicates that the model is 
identified and that the auditor market share is a relevant instrument.  Next, a test for the validity of the 
instrument is applied (a test for no correlation of the instrument with the error term and the endogeneity 
problem of the instrument), by means of a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions.  The null is that the 
excluded instrument (e.g., the auditor market share) is not correlated with the error term in the second-stage 
(i.e., that is the instrument variable is correctly excluded from the ABCFO/ABPROD/ABEXP equations).  
Under this null, the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
over-identifying restrictions.  The result indicates that the auditor market share is an exogenous variable in 
the second stage regressions and is a valid instrument.  Both tests suggest that the auditor market share is a 
valid instrument.  Moreover, the result of the over-identification test mitigates the concern of self-selection.   
That is, the auditor market share is not an endogenous variable in the ABCFO equation.   
20 The results from the regressions of ABCFO/ABEXP/ABPROD on auditor industry specialization support 
the expectation that clients of industry specialist auditors have lower ABCFO and ABEXP than clients of 
non-specialists.  Moreover, the coefficients on Mktshare and Mktsharesq are positive and negative, 
respectively.  The findings are consistent with my expectation that when auditors’ market shares are lower 
than a certain threshold, clients have lower real activities manipulation because their abilities to use 
accounting-based earnings management are not mitigated.  However, when auditors’ market shares exceed 
the threshold, clients exhibit higher real activities manipulation because their abilities to use accounting-
based earnings management are constrained.  
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Table 1.5: 2SLS Regression of Abnormal Cash Flow from Operations on Absolute 
Discretionary Accruals over 1989-2004 (Firms that just meet analysts’ forecasts) 
 
tttttt ABDACNIMTBSIZEABCFO µβββββ +×+×+×+×+= 43210  
tttttt ABDACNIMTBSIZEABEXP µβββββ +×+×+×+×+= 43210  
tttttt ABDACNIMTBSIZEABPROD µβββββ +×+×+×+×+= 43210  
 
 ABCFO ABEXP ABPROD 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficients t value Coefficients t value Coefficients t value 
Intercept -0.0179 -0.46 -0.1707 -1.02 -0.1163 -2.47** 
SIZE 0.0112 2.90*** -0.0133 -0.80 0.0227 4.87*** 
MTB 0.0148 1.40 0.0718 1.58 -0.1226 -9.59*** 
NI 0.0370 2.02** 0.1293 1.64 -0.0125 -0.56 
PDAC 0.2625 2.62*** 0.8177 1.90** 0.0299 0.25 
Adjusted R2 
(%) 
0.92  0.46  5.86  
*** significant at the 1% level ** significant at the 5% level        *significant at the 
10% level  
One- tailed where sings are predicted, two-tailed otherwise. 
 
For variable definitions, refer to Appendix A. 
 
1.4.6 Empirical Results of Hypothesis 1b from the Second Sample (Firm-years 
before New Equity Issuance) 
 
The results reported in Table 1.6 support the notion that the constraints imposed by 
industry specialist auditors indirectly increases real activities manipulation.21  That is, 
firms with strong incentives to manage earnings are more likely to switch to real 
activities manipulation (i.e., sales manipulation, reduction of discretionary expenses, 
                                                 
 
 
21 As predicted, the results show that ABDAC is significantly and positively associated with ABCFO and 
ABEXP, and is significantly negatively associated with ABPROD.   
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and/or overproduction) to reach the desired levels of earnings when their abilities to use 
accounting-based earnings management are limited by industry specialist auditors.22 
 
Table 1.6: 2SLS Regression of Abnormal Cash Flow from Operations on Absolute 
Discretionary Accruals over 1989-2004 (Firm-years before New Equity Issuance) 
 
tttttt ABDACNIMTBSIZEABCFO µβββββ +×+×+×+×+= 43210  
tttttt ABDACNIMTBSIZEABEXP µβββββ +×+×+×+×+= 43210  
tttttt ABDACNIMTBSIZEABPROD µβββββ +×+×+×+×+= 43210  
 
 ABCFO ABEXP ABPROD 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficients t value Coefficients t value Coefficients t value 
Intercept -0.1117 -5.18*** -0.2259 -2.84*** 0.0213 0.91 
SIZE 0.0314 23.19*** -0.0149 -3.00*** 0.0029 1.96** 
MTB -0.0146 -3.72*** 0.0155 1.07 -0.0546 -12.78*** 
NI 0.0000 0.18 0.0000 0.08 0.0000 1.51 
PDAC 0.1495 2.02** 1.1547 4.24*** -0.1938 -2.40*** 
Adjusted R2 
(%) 
3.40  0.52  2.51  
*** significant at the 1% level ** significant at the 5% level        *significant at the 
10% level  
One- tailed where sings are predicted, two-tailed otherwise. 
 
For variable definitions, refer to Appendix A. 
 
1.4.7 Summary of the Empirical Results for the First Set of Hypotheses from Both 
Samples 
 
Overall, the results suggest that (1) clients of industry specialist auditors show less 
accounting-based earnings management and more real activities manipulation than clients 
of non-specialist auditors; (2) industry specialist auditors constrain their clients’ abilities 
                                                 
 
 
22 Consistent with my expectation and the results from the first sample, the direct tests of the association 
between auditor industry specialization and real activities manipulation suggest that clients of industry 
specialist auditors have lower ABCFO, lower ABEXP, and higher ABPROD after controlling for firm size, 
growth rate, and profitability.  The quadratic relations between auditors’ market shares and 
ABCFO/ABEXP/ABPROD are found. 
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to engage in accounting-based earnings management; and (3) the constraints imposed by 
industry specialist auditors force the companies to use more real activities manipulations 
to meet the desired levels of earnings.  The findings are consistent with the expectations 
of Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b. 
 
1.4.8 Additional Tests for Robustness of Findings 
I apply additional tests to examine the sensitivity of my results.  First, I use different 
measures for auditor industry specialization to re-estimate the model that tests the first 
hypotheses.  In this study, I measure auditor’s market share by using total assets.  Danos 
and Eichenseher (1982) suggest that audit fees tend to vary linearly with the square root 
of client size.  Therefore, the auditor market share measure can also be calculated using 
the square root of total assets.  I re-estimate the models using this alternate measure and 
find that inferences are unaffected.  Moreover, I use the OLS regressions to test 
Hypothesis 1b.  The results of the OLS regressions are consistent with the 2SLS 
estimations.23  Hence, the results appear to be robust to different measures of auditor 
industry specialization and to a change in the estimation method. 
 
1.5 Research Method and Empirical Results for Hypothesis 2 
1.5.1 Research Method for Hypothesis 2 
To test whether real activities manipulation results in lower future operating performance, 
return on assets (ROA) is used to capture operating performance.  ROA is a commonly 
used proxy for a firm’s operating performance and is defined as earnings before 
                                                 
 
 
23 The coefficient on PDAC in ABCFO regression of 2SLS is not significant.  But the result of OLS 
regression still indicates that ABCFO increases as ABDAC increases (i.e., ABCFO is significantly 
positively associated with ABDAC). 
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extraordinary items divided by average total assets.  Then, I examine the operating 
performance one, two and three years after the firm-year suspected of manipulating 
earnings through real activities manipulation.  In order to test whether the firms with 
incentives to hire a specialist and to engage in earnings management using real activities 
manipulation show significantly lower future operating performance, I adopt a 
performance-matched sample technique.   
 
I construct a sample by the following procedures: (1) the firm-year is either in the sample 
that firms just meet analysts’ forecasts or in the sample that firms are going to issue 
equities; (2) the firm-year is audited by the industry specialist auditor; (3) the firm-year is 
in the lowest two quintiles of ABDAC; and (4) the firm-year that is in the lowest two 
quintiles of ABCFO/,in the lowest two quintiles of ABEXP/, or in the highest two 
quintiles of ABPROD.  I name these samples as suspect RM_CFO, suspect RM_EXP and 
suspect RM_RPOD samples, respectively.   
 
Then, I identify the performance-matched sample by the following procedures: (1) I 
require the control firm be in the same two-SIC industry as the suspect firm; (2) the 
control firm-year is matched with the suspect firm-year; and (3) I require the ROA of the 
control firm is within +/- 10% of the ROA of the suspect firm.  If there is more than one 
control firm within this range, I randomly select one.  If there is no firm within this range, 
I choose the control firm with the closest ROA to that of the suspect firm.  I expect that 
the suspect firms have lower subsequent operating performance after real activities 
manipulation than their matched samples. 
 
1.5.2 Empirical Results 
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Table 1.7 reports the results for changes in operating performance after real activities 
manipulation.  Although performance matched technique is used, the performance in year 
t between the suspected sample and the control sample is different.  Therefore, I examine 
changes in ROA scaled by ROA in year t (Scaled_ROA) to control for the performance 
difference in year t between two samples.  The results show Scaled_ROA of the 
suspected firm is generally lower than that of the matched firm.  The non-parametric 
matched-pair test is employed to compare the operating performance for years 
subsequent to real activities manipulation between the suspected firms and firms in the 
matched sample.24  The results indicate that the suspected firm’s operating performance 
is worse than its matched firm one year after real activities manipulation.  These findings 
suggest that suspected firms show a lower operating performance in the long run relative 
to the control firms.  The findings provide support for Hypothesis 2 that firms with 
incentives to hire industry specialist auditors and to engage in earnings management 
undertake real activities manipulation, which results in lower future operating 
performance in the long run.  That is, changing operating decisions with the intent to 
reach the desired level of earnings may be suboptimal and can have detrimental effects to 
the firm in the long run. 
 
                                                 
 
 
24 The normality tests suggest that Scaled_ROA is not normally distributed.  The non-parametric test is 
used to compare Scaled_ROA for groups (here the suspected group and the control group).  The test 
makes no assumptions about the shape of the distributions. 
 30 
Table 1.7: Change in Abnormal Operating Performance for Companies Suspected of 
Engaging in Real Activities Manipulation in the Subsequent Three Years 
 
1.6 Conclusions 
Much of the prior research on the effects of auditor industry expertise on earnings 
management has focused on the detection of abnormal level of discretionary accruals.  
This paper extends the literature and examines the effects of auditor industry expertise on 
earnings management through real activities manipulation.  The findings suggest that 
firms with strong incentives to manage earnings are more likely to manipulate real 
activities when they are audited by industry specialist auditors.  Further analysis 
illustrates that such behavior results in clients’ lower future operating performances, 
which is an unintended effect of hiring industry specialist auditors.   
 
This research has important implications for researchers, practitioners, and regulators.  
First, the constraints imposed by industry specialist auditors over accounting-based 
 ABCFO ABEXP ABPROD 
Year Difference in ROA Difference in ROA Difference in ROA 

















Firms that Just 
Meet Analysts’ 
Forecasts 
t+1 0.1700** 0.2040*** 0.1327* 0.1286*** 0.1842*** -0.0992*** 
t+2 0.1593 -0.0276 -0.0094 0.0450 -0.0535** -0.0349 
t+3 -0.2498*** -0.1199** -0.0543** -0.0628* -0.0668 -0.0427 
N 337 118 458 91 539 131 





26 34 24 29 30 31 
*** significant at the 1% level ** significant at the 5% level        *significant at the 
10% level 
 
Difference in ROA = Suspected firm’s Scaled_ROA – Control firm’s  Scaled_ROA 
Scaled_ROA = ROA/ROAt 
t+1 = ROAt+1 - ROAt;  t+2 = ROAt+2 - ROAt+1; t+3 = ROAt+3 - ROAt+2. 
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earnings management force managers to switch to real activities manipulation, which 
could burn the firms’ economic values in the long run.  It, in fact, implies that high audit 
quality (measured by auditor industry expertise) is not necessary to benefit clients in the 
long run.   
 
Second, industry specialist auditors should be aware of the fact that their abilities to 
constrain accounting-based earnings management indirectly force the client companies to 
make operating decisions that deviate from optimal, long-run decisions.  In order to 
mitigate this problem, industry specialist auditors are encouraged to communicate with 
the clients’ managers and make the managers have a better understanding of the harmful 
consequences of real activities manipulation.  Otherwise, hiring industry specialist 
auditors can have an undesirable effect, which is detrimental to firm value in the long 
run.   
 
Third, most managers have already realized that misleading stakeholders about the true 
economic performance of their company by using accounting-based earnings 
management is unethical.  But many of them do not view real activities manipulation as 
misbehavior.25  Therefore, educating managers that taking suboptimal operating activities 
with the intent to reach the desired level of earnings is also considered as unethical is a 
major issue for the regulators now. 
                                                 
 
 
25  Bruns and Merchant’s (1990) survey report that managers view managing earnings via operating 
decisions as more ethical than employing accounting-based earnings management.  
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THE INFLUENCE OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Accounting standards in the United States have come under scrutiny in the past few 
years.  Several accounting failures have led many inside and outside the profession to call 
for change.  These changes have centered on a shift from rules-based accounting (i.e., 
stringent accounting standards) 26  to a more principles-based accounting system (i.e., 
flexible accounting standards)27.  For example, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) placed a 
full-page advertisement in the Wall Street Journal in April 2003 which stated: 
 
“Rules-based systems encourage creativity (not the good kind) in financial reporting. 
They allow some to stretch the limits of what is permissible under the law, even 
though it may not be ethically or morally acceptable.  A principles-based system 
requires companies to report and auditors to audit the substance or business purpose 
of transactions; not merely whether they can qualify as acceptable under incredibly 
complex or overly technical rules…A rules-based system allows managers to ignore 
the substance and, instead ask, ‘Where in the rules does it say I can’t do this?’”28 
 
                                                 
 
 
26 Rules-based accounting standards are referred to as stringent accounting standards because they leave no 
flexibility to accountants in terms of accounting treatment.   
27 Principles-based accounting standards are referred to as flexible accounting standards because they leave 
accountants flexibility to apply accounting standards.   
28 “Principles-Based Accounting. It’s Not New, It’s Not the Rule, It’s the Law”, Ronald M. Mano, Matthew 
Mouritsen, and Ryan Pace, The CPA Journal February 2006 
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Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 also directed the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to study the feasibility of adopting a principles-based 
accounting system.   
 
Although the accounting profession has been buzzing about the rules-based accounting 
standards, it is unclear whether a widespread breakdown of the reliability of financial 
reporting was caused by the current rules-based accounting standards.  The proponents of 
rules-based accounting standards argue that if financial statement preparers and auditors 
feel unconstrained by clearly defined rules, they are unlikely to follow even broader 
principles.  So changing accounting standards is a controversial idea, and such a change 
would have a wide reaching affect on financial reporting.   
 
This dissertation attempts to explore how the flexibility of accounting standards affects 
firms’ financial reporting practices.  Specifically, I examine how earnings management is 
influenced by the tightness of accounting standards.  Earnings management occurs when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers (Healy and Wahlen 1999).29  This definition indicates two 
types of earnings management: earnings management through manipulating accounting 
accruals (i.e., accounting-based earnings management) and through changing operating 
                                                 
 
 
29  In this dissertation,  I restrict earnings management to legitimate actions.   That is, all earnings 
management choices conform with U. S. GAAP. 
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decisions (i.e., real activities manipulation).  Hence, I examine the prevalence of 
accounting-based earnings management and real activities manipulation with the 
different types of the accounting standards.  
  
Further, I examine the effects of accounting standards on managers’ earnings 
management choices across conditions with different institutional investors (short-term-
focused versus long-term-oriented institutional investors).  The focus on institutional 
environment is motivated by the lamentation that institutional investors force corporate 
managers to behave myopically.  Porter (1992) argues that the U.S. system may be failing 
in its ability to move capital to where it is most needed because institutional investors do 
not have an active voice in the management of firms.  He also argues that institutions 
may force managers to pass up profitable long-term projects in favor of short-term 
performance.  The view that institutions are unwilling to monitor managers is shared by 
Black (1992).  Both of them indicate that an effective institutional monitoring mechanism 
plays an important role in the U.S. accounting system. 
 
My findings suggest that the monitoring activities of institutional investors are associated 
with their investment time horizons.  I find that institutional investors with a long-term 
investment time horizon (i.e., long-term-oriented institutional investors) are more likely 
to take an active role to monitor corporate managers than those with a short-term 
investment time horizon (i.e., short-term-focused institutional investors).   
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In addition, the evidence indicates that the institutional monitoring activities have a 
significant impact on the change of managers’ earnings management strategy with the 
decreased flexibility of accounting standards.  Specifically, I find that with short-term-
focused institutional investors, stringent accounting standards (rules-based accounting 
standards) force corporate managers to switch to real activities manipulation because 
tightening accounting standards make it more difficult for the managers to find feasible 
accounting-based earnings management opportunities.  The only earnings management 
means left is real activities manipulation.  However, with long-term-oriented institutional 
investors, corporate managers are less likely to switch to real activities manipulation with 
stringent accounting standards because shareholders with a long horizon have more 
incentives to invest their resources in monitoring (even if their stake is not large) and they 
are likely to reap the corresponding benefits from monitoring (Gaspar et al. 2005).   
 
I also document that, without the long-term institutional investors’ monitoring 
mechanism, managers with a short-term focus favor real activities manipulation more 
than long-term managers.  In contrast, with the presence of long-term institutional 
investors’ monitoring mechanism, short-term managers are less likely to choose real 
activities manipulation. 
 
This dissertation contributes to the current debate on the impact of the type of accounting 
standards on the pervasiveness of earnings management by introducing other factors such 
as investment time horizon of institutional investors.  The evidence suggests that 
managers’ earnings-management choices in response to different types of accounting 
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standards are significantly influenced by institutional investors’ monitoring activities.  
My findings support the argument by Porter (1992) and Black (1992) that the U.S. 
financial reporting system would be better off if institutional shareholders take greater, 
more long-term stake in corporations and actively monitor management.  This 
dissertation also sheds lights on how managers’ compensation schemes affect their 
earnings management decisions.  Managers with a short-term focus are more sensitive to 
short-term performance of the company, and can use their discretion to sacrifice future 
cash flows to boost current period earnings if the monitoring mechanism is weak. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2.2 reviews the prior literature.  
Section 2.3 provides a research framework.  The research method is presented and 
hypotheses developed in Section 2.4.  The results are discussed in Section 2.5, followed 
by a summary and conclusion in Section 2.6. 
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2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Earnings Management 
Earnings management is defined as “a purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intention of obtaining some private gain” (Schipper 1989).  
Earnings management can be undertaken either by manipulating discretionary accruals 
(i.e., accounting-based earnings management) or through real activities manipulation 
(i.e., real activities manipulation).  Accounting-based management is not accomplished 
by changing the underlying economic activities of the firm but through the choice of 
accounting methods or estimates, whereas real activities manipulation is accomplished by 
changing the firm’s underlying operations.  A large body of prior literature documents 
accounting-based earnings management.  Hence, I focus on the discussion of real 
activities manipulation. 
 
2.2.1.1 Differences between Accounting-based Earnings Management and Real Activities 
Manipulation 
 
An important difference between accounting-based earnings management and real 
activities manipulation is the timing of earnings management.  In contrast to accounting-
based management, any manipulation of real activities has to occur during the course of 
the year.  Real activities manipulation occurs when managers anticipate that earnings will 
fail to meet a target unless they undertake actions that deviate from the normal practice 
and/or when some other factors (e.g., stringent accounting standards) restrict accounting-
based earnings management.   
 
To meet a certain earnings target, managers can wait until the year-end to use 
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discretionary accruals to manage reported earnings.  This strategy runs the risk that the 
amount of earnings that needs to be manipulated is greater than the available 
discretionary accruals because the accruals discretion is bounded by GAAP (Barton and 
Simko 2002).  Given the underlying economic transactions of a firm, management’s 
ability to report accruals-based earnings is limited.  As a result, the earnings target may 
not be reached using discretionary accruals at year end.  Managers can reduce this risk by 
manipulating real activities during the year.  In addition, accruals will reverse as well, so 
management has to consider the implications of their discretion on current accruals for 
future earnings.  This consideration constrains accounting-based earnings management.  
In contrast, real activities manipulations are less subject to this constraint.   
 
Another advantage of altering real activities to manipulate earnings is that auditors and 
regulators are less likely to be concerned with such behavior. 30   Accounting-based 
earnings management is relatively transparent in the year of the change; it may be flagged 
by the auditor in a public way and may receive footnote disclosure.  Real activities 
manipulation, which, merely contributes to operating decisions, may be harder for an 
outsider to observe (Schipper 1989) and is less likely to be judged to be violations of 
securities law.  However, real activities manipulation is costly, including the possibility 
that cash flows in future periods are affected negatively by the actions taken currently to 
increase earnings.   
                                                 
 
 
30 The rise of accounting-based earnings management in recent years has prompted calls for reforms to 
restore investor confidence in reported accounting information.  Regulators and standard setters make every 
effort to improve the transparency of financial statements and to enhance the monitoring mechanisms of 
discretionary accruals.   
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2.2.1.2 Evidence of Real Activities Manipulation 
Empirical evidence has shown that firms manage earnings using real activities (i.e., via 
operating decisions).  Most of the evidence centers on the opportunistic reduction of 
R&D expenses.  For example, Bushee (1998) finds that firms reduce R&D more in the 
presence of lower institutional ownership.  He interprets this as evidence that the R&D 
reductions by this set of firms are potentially value-destroying.  Baber et al. (1991) 
provide evidence that R&D spending is significantly less when spending jeopardizes the 
ability to report positive or increasing income in the current period.  Although cutting 
these discretionary expenses can boost earnings to meet certain targets, it entails the risk 
of lower future cash flow from operations (CFO) because this action generally has a 
positive effect on current CFO.  In the subsequent years, this positive effect may be 
reserved.  Evidence exits on firms engaging in other types of real activities manipulation 
in addition to R&D expense reduction.   
 
Bartov (1993) provides evidence on managers selling fixed assets in order to avoid 
negative earnings growth and debt covenant violations.  Gunny (2005) also documents 
that the timing of asset sales could be used as a way to manage reported earnings.  The 
timing of asset sales is a manager’s choice and the gain/loss is reported on the income 
statement at the time of the sale.  This provides managers opportunities to manipulate 
earnings.  Herrmann et al. (2003) investigate Japanese managers’ use of income from the 
sale of assets to manage earnings.  They find that firms increase earnings through the sale 
of fixed assets and marketable securities when current operating income falls below 
management’s forecasted operating income. 
 
Thomas and Zhang (2002) provide evidence on managers taking advantage of the 
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absorption costing system required by GAAP to report lower cost of goods sold (COGS).  
These managers produce more than the quantity required to meet sales and normal target 
inventory levels to decrease reported COGS, resulting in increases in reported earnings.  
Although it improves the profitability margin, the firm incurs costs and lower than 
normal cash flow from operations (CFO).   
 
Roychowdhury (2006) finds that managers offer price discounts to boost sales and 
engage in over production to reduce reported cost of goods sold.  Managers provide deep 
discounts towards fiscal year end to increase sales.  The increased sales volume that is 
generated is likely to disappear when the firm re-establishes the old prices.  This action, 
in fact, moves the future profitability to the current period.  As a result, the future 
profitability may be harmed by sales management.   
 
Graham et al. (2005) document CFOs admitting to delaying or cutting the travel budget 
and maintenance expense, postponing or eliminating capital investments (to avoid 
depreciation charges), asset securitizations and managing the funding of pension plans.  
Overall, real activities manipulation is accomplished by a wide variety of operating 
decisions, which could have an economically significant impact on subsequent operating 
performance.   
 
2.2.1.3 Costs of Real Activities Manipulation 
A company is typically harmed when managers manipulate earnings.  First, when 
managers manipulate earnings to meet earnings target, contracts require the company to 
deliver larger financial rewards to the manager.  Second, the time and effort managers 
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devote to manipulation are often time and effort they might otherwise devote to 
productive activities.  Therefore, manipulation can simultaneously reduce performance 
and impose greater financial obligations on the company (Demski et al. 2004).   
 
Besides the above costs caused by earnings management (both accounting and real 
earnings management), real activities manipulation has real economic costs.  If a manager 
deviates from the optimal level of real operating activities and engages in real activities 
manipulation, then presumably there would be long run economic consequences.  Real 
activities manipulation negatively impacts future firm performance because the manager 
is willing to sacrifice future cash flows for current period income.  Being a single-period 
measure, accounting numbers or ratios based on income or profit can induce myopic 
behavior among managers.  For example, consider the case of current expenditures such 
as R&D costs which reduce current income and may not generate revenues until some 
later period.  If the manager is compensated based on current income, she has a 
disincentive to incur these expenses. 
 
Stein (1989) shows that, in the face of a rational stock market, managers would sacrifice 
total cash flows to boost near-term income in an effort to influence the market’s current 
assessment of the firm’s value.  Along similar lines, Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) 
indicate that real activities manipulation gives rise to potentially significant efficiency 
costs.  Bar-Gill and Bebchuk model the misreporting of corporate performance when a 
firm is likely to issue stock and the ability to misreport requires sacrificing cash.   
 
Similarly, Roychowhury (2006) recently documents the costs to operation and efficient 
performance that companies incur in order to report higher earnings.  The costs of real 
activities manipulation include the possibility that cash flows in future periods are 
affected negatively by the actions taken this period to increase earnings.  For example, 
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price discounts offered in any period to boost total earnings and meet some short-term 
target can lead customers to expect such discounts in future periods as well, leading to 
lower cash inflows from sales in the future.  Roychowdhury also finds that firms 
reporting small positive annual earnings have abnormally low cash from operations and 
abnormally high production costs, providing evidence of manipulation through real 
activities.   
 
2.2.2 Managers’ Compensation Schemes and Earnings Management 
Incentives to manage earnings primarily arise from contractual schemes.  A number of 
studies have examined actual compensation contracts to identify managers’ earnings 
management incentives.  The evidence reported in these studies is consistent with 
managers using discretionary judgment to increase performance-based monetary awards.  
For example, Healy (1985) presents evidence that the accruals policies of managers are 
related to the non-linear incentives inherent in their bonus contracts.  Holthausen et al. 
(1995) show that firms with caps on bonus awards are more likely to report accruals that 
defer income when that cap is reached than firms that have comparable performance but 
which have no bonus cap. 
 
In addition to explicit earnings-based compensation contracts, executives are also 
rewarded on equity-based contracts.  Hall and Liebman (1998) document that the median 
exposure of CEO wealth to the firm value tripled between 1980 and 1994.  The higher 
exposure is caused by the performance-based compensation such as grants of stock 
options.  Presumably these managers, with their personal wealth more directly tied to the 
stock prices of their firms, have a greater incentive to engage in earnings management 
that increases the value of their share holdings.  
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Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) provide evidence that earnings management is more 
pronounced at firms where the CEO’ potential total compensation is more closely tied to 
the value of stock and option holdings.  They also find that following years of high 
accruals, companies, on average, see sharp reductions in the total return they deliver to 
their stakeholders.  However, Johnson et al. (2005) conclude that only unrestricted stock 
holdings are associated with the occurrence of accounting fraud, while the stock option 
grants are not, while Erickson et al. (2006) find no consistent evidence that executive 
equity incentives are associated with fraud. 
 
Several other studies have examined whether implicit compensation contracts have any 
effect on earnings management incentives.  These studies have tested whether there is an 
increase in the frequency of earnings management in periods when top managers’ job 
security is threatened or their expected tenure with the firm is short.  DeAngelo (1988) 
reports that during a proxy contest incumbent managers appear to exercise accounting 
discretion to improve reported earnings.  Dechow and Sloan (1991) show that in their 
final years CEOs reduce research and development spending, presumably to increase 
reported earnings.  They argue that this behavior is consistent with the short-term nature 
of many CEOs’ compensation combined with their short horizons.  Beneish and Vargus 
(2002) find evidence that managers manipulate earnings during periods when they or 
their companies are selling shares to capital markets.   
 
 
The evidence suggests that various mechanisms may be used to try to constrain earnings 
management, such as efficiency wages, commissions, or fear of firing.  An appropriate 
compensation contract is an effective way to mitigate the manager’s myopic behavior.  
However, compensation contracts that are designed to offset the manager’s hyper-myopic 
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behavior are costly to stakeholders.  These costs arise from the increasing share of long-
term cash flows that belongs to the manager.  To induce the manager not to choose 
suboptimal operating decisions, the firm has to make incentive payments that add to the 
accounting-based bonus.  Given the fact that the appropriate compensation contracts can 
be extremely costly to the stakeholders, the monitoring mechanism can be used as a 
complement to constrain the aberrant behaviors of the managers.  The high level of 
constraints from accounting standards and/or institutional investors is expected to reduce 
the variance of the manager’s performance and to improve the transparency of the firm’s 
operating activities.   
 
2.2.3 Accounting Standards 
I examine the costs and benefits of rules-based versus principles-based accounting 
standards.  Rules-based standards include numerous clearly-defined rules known as 
bright-line tests and numerous exceptions to the underlying principles of the standards 
that create a need for detailed implementation guidance.31  Principles-only standards limit 
implementation guidance.  Principles-based standards provide a clear statement of the 
accounting principle.  The objective of the standard is included with sufficient specificity.  
It contains few, if any, exceptions to the standard, and it contains a level of 
implementation guidance that is appropriate for the type of transactions that will be 
covered by the standard.   
                                                 
 
 
31 Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United 
States Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting System, Office of the Chief 
Accountant, Office of Economic Analysis, United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
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However, the degree of details does not distinguish a rule from a principle.  The 
distinction between rules and principles implies a role for professional judgment and is 
clearly germane to the principles- vs. rules-based debate in accounting.  The SEC staff 
study recognizes that a rules-based approach intentionally minimizes accounting 
judgment by establishing complicated, finely articulated rules that attempt to anticipate 
all possible application challenges.  Hence, rules-based accounting standards provide 
more precise accounting standards, resulting in less room to manipulate financial 
numbers through accounting treatment.  I refer to the rules-based accounting standards as 
stringent accounting standards, whereas principles-based accounting standards are 
referred to as flexible accounting standards.   
 
2.2.3.1 Costs and Benefits of Principles-based Standards (Flexible Accounting Standards) 
 
Principles-based standards use broad guidelines that focus on the spirit of an underlying 
principle.  The standards are based on underlying principles with the application and 
implementation in the hands of the preparers.  The most compelling argument for a 
principles-based system is that of presenting substance over form.  Application of a 
principles-based approach would focus on the intent of the principle rather than the 
bright-line rule, thereby reducing the gamesmanship of circumventing the rules.  Another 
benefit of a principles-based system is reduced complexity.  Principles-based standards 
would not require detailed guidance to deal with increasingly complex transactions.  
Accordingly, a principles-based system requires professional judgment.  Preparers need 
to focus on applying the core principles rather than searching for or demanding specific 
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guidance.  More important, a principles-based approach focuses financial statement 
preparers and auditors on the fairness of the overall financial presentation rather than on 
satisfying detailed provisions.   
 
Concern that a principles-based system creates even greater potential for earnings 
management is a powerful counterargument.  Some fear that if financial statement 
preparers and auditors feel unconstrained by clearly defined rules, they are unlikely to 
follow even broader principles.  Consequently, U.S. GAAP from the 1930s to the present 
has become much more details-oriented and stringent.  It has evolved over the decades 
from a more principles-based set of guidelines to an enormously detailed set of 
prescriptions.  Many preparers have become less willing to exercise professional 
judgment in areas involving accounting estimates, uncertainties, and inherent 
subjectivity.  Increased accountability for the accuracy of financial information under the 
new requirements related to the SOX further reduces the preparer’s willingness to 
exercise judgment on accounting estimates.  Therefore, the reduced accounting discretion 
may have the unintended consequence of impeding a manager’s ability to communicate 
the firm’s prospects to investors. 
 
2.2.3.2 Costs and Benefits of Rules-based Standards (Stringent Accounting Standards) 
Given the litigious nature of the U.S., the greatest benefit of rules-based standards is the 
ability to cite a rule and claim adherence to the rule.  It can be expected that the costs of 
dealing with the myriad of regulatory bodies will be reduced by using rules-based 
standards.  Also, proponents of rules-based standards cite comparability as a benefit of 
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such standards.  They state that greater comparability will be achieved if professional 
judgment is removed from the application of the standard.   
 
However, no matter how the rules are technically detailed, there are, inevitably, many 
interpretive actions taken by management in preparing and certifying a company’s 
financial statements.  Indeed, the process of preparing the company’s financial statements 
essentially constitutes a translation of economic reality into an accounting framework as 
defined by a set of standards.  Likewise, certifying to the appropriateness of those 
financial statements requires the managers to make an informed judgment as to whether 
the financial statements are representative of economic reality, in accordance with a set of 
standards.  This interpretive process necessarily involves judgment.   
 
In addition, rules-based standards lead to engineering of the financial statements.  Firms 
can take advantage of bright-line tests to subvert the intent of the standard for their own 
gain.  An example of this is the much maligned lease standard.  When it was issued, the 
goal was to include more leases on the balance sheet – thereby providing a more faithful 
representation of the true financial condition of the firm.  Because of the bright-line tests 
included in the standard, firms have been able to exclude more leases from the balance 
sheet than they could prior to the issuance of the standard. 
   
Accounting standards that are developed under a rules-based approach must be 
continuously updated.  Whenever a new transaction is engineered, or a variation of an 
existing transaction occurs, guidance or a new amendment must be added.  Therefore, a 
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rules-based approach is always at least one step behind.  The detailed level of 
interpretative guidance, amendments to existing guidance, and rulings issued by various 
bodies add to the complexity and have caused a rules explosion.  As business processes 
have become more complex, accounting rules have rapidly changed and expanded.  Many 
standards are so complex that their application, implementation, and implications require 
explanation.  Rules-based GAAP has become more complicated because of the numerous 
exceptions woven into the standards. These exceptions make applying a standard to a 
given transaction even more difficult.  
 
2.2.4 The Role of Institutional Governance 
2.2.4.1 Institutional Investor and Accounting-based Earnings Management 
Several prior studies investigate the monitoring role of institutional investors by 
searching for evidence of pure accounting earnings management and find inconsistent 
results.  Perry and Williams (1994) examine earnings management in anticipation of a 
management buyout.  In this situation, management has incentives to reduce current 
earnings and thereby achieve a favorable purchase price.  The results indicate evidence of 
earnings management prior to a management buyout.  The same results hold for both low 
and high institutional ownership firms.  Because the management of firms with higher 
institutional ownership is no less likely to adopt an earnings management strategy, this 
study does not support the monitoring role of institutional investors.  However, Dechow 
et al. (1996) indicate that the presence of institutional investors has been found to 
mitigate managerial incentives to report aggressively.  Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 
(1998) support this assertion and find evidence that institutional ownership is associated 
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with less income increasing discretionary accruals.  Along a similar line, Cheng and 
Reitenga (2000) show the same result that active institutional shareholders mitigate 
income increasing discretionary accruals when there is pressure to increase earnings.  In 
all, there are no consistent results on whether institutional investors can constrain pure 
accounting earnings management.  The inconsistent results may be due to the limitation 
that these studies are unable to distinguish between long-term-oriented institutional 
investors and short-term-focused institutional investors.  
 
2.2.4.2 Effects of Institutional Investor on Corporate Myopia  
A number of prior empirical studies examine institutionally induced management 
myopia.  One of the earliest studies is by Jarrell et al. (1985).  Jarrell et al. estimate a 
cross-sectional regression for the years 1980-1983 with a sample of 324 firms in which 
R&D expenditure is the dependent variable and institutional share ownership is the 
independent variable.  They find a positive association between R&D expenditures and 
institutional ownership and, therefore, reject the contention that institutional investors 
depress corporate expenditures for R&D.  A shortcoming of this paper is that it does not 
include control variables that might also be correlated with R&D spending, nor do they 
account for endogeneity in their regressions.   
 
Subsequent studies refine the Jarrell et al. regression by including various control 
variables.  Baysinger et al. (1991) and Hansen and Hill (1991) find a positive relation 
between institutional ownership and R&D spending, but their samples are limited.  
Baysinger et al. (1991) examine 174 firms, while Hansen and Hill (1991) limit 
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themselves to four industries.  However, both studies do not control for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity, which could significantly affect inferences.  Moreover, none of these 
studies account for endogenity or attempt to disentangle cross-sectional correlations from 
a causal relationship.   
 
A later study by Bushee (1998) examines reductions in R&D spending to determine 
whether firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to cut R&D spending in 
response to an earnings decline.  He specifically examines whether managers of firms 
with high institutional ownership are more or less likely to cut R&D spending to manage 
short-term earnings.  His sample encompasses firms that experienced an earnings decline 
during a year, which could subsequently be reversed by a cut in R&D expenditures.  He 
estimates a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is one if the firm cut R&D 
expenditure, and zero otherwise.  The key independent variable is the fraction of shares 
owned by institutional investors.  The results suggest that institutional investors fulfill a 
monitoring role by reducing management’s incentive to cut research and development 
expenses.   
 
Although Bushee’s (1998) paper makes a substantial improvement compared to the 
previous work, it has potential limitations.  First, Bushee (1998) makes an implicit 
assumption that a firm’s current level of R&D expenditure is optimal, which may not be 
true, which indicates that cutting R&D expenses may not be a suboptimal decision.  
Second, even thought Bushee’s tests can examine the issue of real activities manipulation 
(i.e., assuming cutting R&D expenses is indeed a real activities manipulation), he does 
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not address whether institutional ownership leads to a reduction of other types of real 
activities manipulation, e.g., lower spending for projects with long-term payoffs (e.g., 
PP&E). 
 
Bange and De Bondt (1998) examine the management of R&D expenditures and the 
association with institutional shareholders.  They conclude there is less earnings 
management related to R&D when institutional shareholdings are high.  A later study by 
Wahal and McConnell (2000) analyzes corporate expenditures for PP&E and R&D for 
over 2,500 U.S. firms from 1988 to 1994.  They find a positive relation between industry-
adjusted expenditures for PP&E and R&D and the fraction of shares owned by 
institutional investors.  Again, both studies have the same limitations as Bushee (1998). 
 
Inconsistent with other studies, Graves (1988) finds a negative relation between 
institutional ownership and R&D spending, suggesting that institutional investors 
encourage managerial myopic behavior.  But this study has several limitations.  It is 
restricted to the computer industry, which limits generalizability.  In addition, it fails to 
control for several key variables and suffers from an endogenity problem, which 
undermines the validity of the analysis. 
 
Overall, the prior literature does not show consistent evidence on the role of institutional 
investors in attenuating managerial myopic behavior.  The inconsistency may be due to 




2.2.4.3 Types of Institutional Investors 
In the behavioral finance literature, short-termism is most commonly referred to as 
myopic behavior and the resulting tendency to over-emphasize the present (near term 
earnings) at the expense of longer horizons (Frederick et al. 2002).  Some institutional 
shareholders are inherently short-term oriented.  They are often referred to as myopic or 
transient investors who focus excessively on current earnings rather than long-term 
earnings in determining stock prices (Bushee 1998; Porter 1992).   
 
Prior literature identifies several factors that provide institutional investors incentives to 
focus on a short-term horizon.  For instance, regular performance assessments and 
industry performance ranking of institutional investors create incentives for some 
institutional investors to adopt a short investment horizon (Black and Coffee 1994; 
Stapledon 1996a).  A short horizon deters institutional investors from incurring 
monitoring costs, as the benefits of governing the portfolio firms are unlikely to accrue to 
investors in the short run (Porter 1992).  In addition, the need to rebalance their portfolio 
to maintain or to improve their own performance does not allow sufficient time or 
resources for institutional investors to be actively involved in monitoring of their 
portfolio firms beyond their performance assessment cycle (Black and Coffee 1994; 
Stapledon 1996a). 
 
Consistent with these arguments, Bushee (2001) finds that transient institutional investors 
exhibit a strong preference for near-term earnings, which translates into mis-evaluation of 
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stock prices where the long-term earnings are under-weighted.  Institutional investors are 
found to sell their shares as a result of the under-performance of current earnings (Pound 
and Shiller 1987; Lang and McNichols 1997).  The excessive focus on current earnings 
by such institutional investors creates incentives for firm managers to manage short-term 
earnings upwards (Graves and Waddock 1990; Porter 1992; Stapledon 1996b; Tomasic 
and Bottomley 1993). 
 
However, not all institutions are short-term focused.  As institutional shareholding grows, 
selling shares becomes more expensive, since large block sales generally entail large 
discounts (Black and Coffee 1994; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 1998).  Hence, some 
institutions are becoming long-term investors who will take a more active role in 
corporate governance matters because their shares cannot be sold without adversely 
affecting the sale price.32  Long-term-oriented institutional investors ameliorate agency 
problems by monitoring managerial decisions because only institutional shareholders 
with long-term focus have sufficient incentives to undertake monitoring activities on 
firms’ long-term performance.  That is, when institutional investors have substantial 
shareholdings, it becomes difficult to sell the shares immediately at the prevailing market 
price.  This lack of marketability implies institutional investors become long-term 
investors and, thus, they have incentives to closely monitor companies (Maug 1998), 
especially those with potential costly agency problems.  Furthermore, when institutions 
become long-term investors, given the large monetary value tied to these institutional 
                                                 
 
 
32 Wahal (1996) shows that an active fund does not reduce its holding in poorly performing firms, while 
other individual investors do.   
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investors, institutional investors stand to lose more than individual investors if they 
remain passive, or choose to be less informed about their portfolio firms when their 
portfolio is under-performing (Pound 1992). 
 
2.2.4.4 Do Preferences of Institutional Investors Affect Managerial Decisions? 
The market separation theorem divorces the equity investor’s (owner’s) investment 
choice decision from the manager’s operating decision about how to run the firm.  The 
separation theorem has substantive implications for decision making by both managers 
and investors.  Fama and Miller (1972) define the principle of separation as optimal 
production decisions that are independent of the details of owner tastes.  That is, the 
separation theorem indicates that managers should manage the firm irrespective of the 
tastes and preferences of their shareholders. However, later, Bushee (1998) proposes an 
earnings timing clienteles hypothesis, which argues that it is plausible that managers 
respond to the preferences of their ownership base when making operating, investment, 
and financing decisions.   
 
The clienteles hypothesis seems to persist because institutional investors have influential 
power to monitor corporate managers.  The preference of institutional investors can be 
communicated to corporate managers either explicitly through corporate governance 
practices or implicitly through information gathering and correctly pricing the impact of 
managerial decisions (Bushee 1998).  The Business Week Harris Poll reveals that 60 
percent of the 400 CEOs surveyed indicate that institutional investors exert the most 
pressure on firms to focus on short-term performance (Nussbaum 1987).  It provides 
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evidence that myopic demand for short-term institutional investors causes managers to 
take very short-term perspectives that have adverse consequences in the long run.  
Corporate managers are expected to be sensitive to stock price performance and manage 
their firms so as to avoid the appearance of any sag in short-term earnings (Wahal and 




2.3 Research Framework 
2.3.1 Background 
The paper extends the studies by Demski (2004) and Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005).  
Demski (2004) sketches a model with substitution between accounting and real earnings 
management.  He assumes that tighter standards reduce accounting earnings 
management, but increases real earnings management.  Along a similar line, Ewert and 
Wagenhofer (2005) examine the substitution effect between accounting earnings 
management and real manipulation.  Their model distinguishes between accounting and 
real earnings management and assume that a standard setter can only influence 
accounting earnings management by the tightness of standards.  They predict that 
managers increase costly real earnings management because higher earnings quality 
increases the marginal benefit of real earnings management. 
 
The focus of this study is on comparisons of stringent and flexible accounting standards 
by adding other factors such as types of managers (short-term vs. long-term managers) 
and investment horizons of institutional investors (short-term-focused vs. long-term-
oriented institutional investors).  I consider two strategic players, a risk neutral manager 
and a risk neutral institutional investor.  I use two periods to represent a multi-period 
setting.  In the first period, the strategic interaction occurs, and in the second period 
earnings management activities unwind.   
 
2.3.2 Two Types of Earnings Management 
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The firm operates an accounting system which records transactions and events, according 
to a certain set of accounting standards in force, and produces the base information for a 
periodic financial report.  The base information is an unbiased signal of the realized 
earnings ei.  After observing a private signal on earning ei, a manager can either report 
truthfully or manage earnings to a desired level.  Two types of earnings management 
activities are available to the manager: accounting-based earnings management and real 
activities manipulation.  The manager chooses dA (the amount of accounting-based 
earnings management) and/or dR (the amount of real activities manipulation) to manage 
the reported earning fi relative to ei in the following way: 
RA ddef ++= 11  and 
RRA cdddef −−−= 22  
 
fi = reported earning in period i; i = 1, 2, 
ei = privately observed earnings by the manager before any manipulation, 
dA = amount of accounting-based earnings management, and 
dR = amount of real activities manipulation. 
  
Most accounting-based earnings management involves shifting accounting earnings from 
one period to another.  I assume that if the manager changes reported earning in the first 
period, the reported earning in the second period change by –dA.  In contrast, real 
activities manipulation occurs when the manager undertakes actions that are sub-optimal 
from the shareholder’s perspective, but generate a desired level of earnings for the first 
period.  Thus, real activities manipulation imposes costs on the firm by an amount over 
and above dR in the second period.  For example, real activities manipulation of earnings 
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upward through delaying desirable training or maintenance expenditures or cutting prices 
to boost sales has real consequences and can impose costs beyond today’s benefits.  I 
model these costs as a linear function of real activities manipulation, cdR, where c  0, 
and it is incurred in the second period.   
 
2.3.3 Type of Manager  
I adopt Ewert and Wagenhofer’s (2005) utility function of the manager that depends on 
accounting earnings and market price.  Managers’ incentives to manage earnings are 
mainly due to compensation schemes, including accounting-based bonuses and stock-
option based contracts (such as employee stock options, ESO, programs).  In practice, 
bonus- and stock/option-based contracts provide different incentives to manage earnings.  
Managers with accounting-based bonus compensation contracts are perceived to be short-
term focused while managers with stock/option-based compensation contracts are long-
term focused.  With a bonus program, managers have an incentive to move earnings to 
the period when a (higher) bonus can be achieved.  That is, managers have incentives to 
inflate current-period performance because managers’ compensation is only tied to 
current-period earnings and price.  Hence, short-term managers have the following utility 
function: 
),(11 RAshortmgr ddvpPsfU −+= . 
 
With a stock/stock option program, managers have concerns on both short-term 
performance and long-term value of the firm because managers also have ownership 
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interests in the firm.  Based on these preferences, long-term managers have a different 
utility function than short-term managers.   
),(2211 RAlongmgr ddvPfpPsfU −+++= , 
 
P1 = market price in period 1,  
P2 = market price in period 2,  
s = the relative weight on current period reported earnings, the weight attached on the 
accounting report f1 relative to f2, s  0, 
p = the relative weight on current period price, the weight attached on the price P1 
relative to P2, p  0, and 
v = manager’s disutility from engaging in earnings management.  
 
The disutility v is convex in both accounting-based earnings management and real 
activities manipulation because it becomes increasingly cumbersome for the manager to 
find more opportunity for either type of earnings management.  The disutility also 







ddv +=  
 
The parameters, a and r, capture the disutility of accounting-based earnings management 
and real activities manipulation, respectively.  Disutility includes manager’s effort to 
engage in earnings management, constraints from accounting standards and other 
regulations, and litigation risk.   
 





+= βα  and 
221222 ffP
∧∧
++= γβα . 
 
 captures the magnitude of the market’s adjustment for expected bias.  In this study, I set 
 < 0 because the conventional view in prior work suggests that the manager often biases 
reported earnings upward; consequently, the adjustment for expected bias is negative.  
Given the inability to discern the manager’s precise objective, the market can only 
conjecture the extent to which the manager has an incentive to inflate expectations.  I 
hold market conjecture of the manager’s incentive to inflate expectations constant across 
different types of accounting standards.   and  capture the value relevance of reported 
earnings (0 <  < 1; 0 <  < 1).  A caret (i.e., “^”) denotes a conjecture.  I also require that 
2 < 2 because I assume that current period reported earnings receive more weight.  In 
addition, I assume that the conjectures of the market and manager are met, i.e., 
∧
= αα , 
∧
= ββ , 
∧
= γγ . 
 



































The linear contract assumption in my design captures the pay-for-performance essence of 
these compensation schemes.   It does not, however, fully capture their richness and 
complexity.   
 





RA rdadffPfEfpPsf −−+++ . 
 
The first-order conditions for the short-term managers’ utility function with respect to dA 



































The first-order conditions for the long-term managers’ utility function with respect to dA 



































Based on managers’ utility functions, short-term managers are more likely to engage in 
real activities manipulation than long-term managers because the detrimental effects of 
real activities manipulation in the second period are less likely to affect short-term 
managers’ payoffs. 
 
2.3.4 Investment Time Horizon of Institutional Investors 
Apart from managers, institutional investors have the potential to impact a company’s 
corporate governance, as well as managers’ decisions, due to their power in the capital 
market and ability to understand financial information.  Institutional investors are 
sophisticated and better informed than individual investors and have stronger incentives 
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to monitor their investments.  An institutional investor can influence managerial 
decisions through the capital market in two ways: vote with his or her feet by selling 
holdings in the firm or take an active role to constrain myopic managerial decisions.  
Hirschman (1971) characterizes these alternatives as exit and voice.   
 
Institutional investors with different investment time horizons are expected to respond 
differently when there is a disagreement with management depending on their investment 
horizons.  Institutional investors with short-term investment horizon have limited 
incentive to get involved in corporate governance issues because they are always ready to 
dump the shares, whereas long-term-oriented institutions are more likely to serve a 
monitoring role by reducing pressures for managers to behave myopically.  That is, long-
term-oriented institutional investors discourage managers from engaging in real earnings 
management by voicing their concerns, while short-term-focused institutional investors 
are not willing to perform a monitoring role. 
 
Since short-term-focused investors are defined as investors who prefer current earnings to 
long-term earnings and prefer to sell shares of firms (i.e., exit) with current earnings that 
are under-performing (e.g., Bushee 1998, 2001), short-term-focused investors’ utility 
function is only related to the short-term price (P1) because they sell shares in a short-
period of time.  Short-term-focused institutional investors’ utility function is presented 
below: 
11PwU shortinv =  
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The above utility function indicates that institutional investors with a short-term 
investment horizon have limited incentive to get involved in corporate governance issues 
compared to institutional investors with a long-term horizon because they are always 
ready to dump their shares. 
 
As institutional shareholding grows, selling shares becomes more expensive, because 
large block sales generally entail large discounts (Black and Coffee 1994; Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam 1998).  Hence, some institutions are becoming long-term investors, 
taking a more active role in corporate governance matters because their shares cannot be 
sold without adversely affecting the sale price. 33   Long-term-oriented institutional 
investors ameliorate agency problems by monitoring managerial decisions because only 
institutional shareholders with long-term focus have sufficient incentives to undertake 
monitoring activities on firms’ long-term performance.  Long-term-oriented institutional 
investors’ utility function is: 
22 PwU longinv =  
 
According to the clienteles hypothesis by Bushee (1998), institutional investors’ 
preferences affect corporate managers’ decisions.  Short-term-focused institutions are 
impatient and this impatience is communicated to corporate managers through pressure 
on stock prices.  One consequence is that managers are discouraged from engaging in 
                                                 
 
 
33 Wahal (1996) shows that an active fund does not reduce its holding in poorly performing firms, while 
other individual investors do.   
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projects with long-term payoffs, and instead focus on projects with short-term payoffs.  
By comparison, managers monitored by long-term-oriented institutional investors are less 
likely to engage in myopic behavior.   
 
2.3.5 Flexibility of Accounting Standards 
Besides managers and institutional investors, accounting standards can have a substantial 
impact on managers’ earnings management decisions.  The major function of financial 
reports is to convey managers’ private information on their firms’ performance to other 
parties, primarily shareholders.  In order to facilitate this function, standards have to 
permit managers to exercise judgment in financial reporting.  Managers can then use their 
knowledge about the business and its opportunities to select reporting methods and 
estimates that match the firms’ business economics, potentially increasing the value of 
accounting as a form of communication.   
 
Yet, managers’ use of judgment also creates opportunities for earnings management, in 
which managers choose reporting methods and estimates that do not adequately reflect 
their firms’ underlying economics.  Therefore, many practitioners as well as academic 
researchers believe that stringent accounting standards restrain corporate managers’ 
earnings management behaviors because they leave less room for managers to use 
discretion in accounting choices.  As a result, U.S. GAAP from the 1930s to the present 
has become much more details-oriented and stringent.   
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However, the recent wave of accounting failures has raised concerns about the rules-
based accounting standards.  Many industry professionals feel that the standards-setting 
process of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has become overly reliant 
on rules.  The effect of the decreased flexibility of accounting standards on earnings 
management behavior has been on debate.  Proponents of principles-based standards 
argue a rules-based regime may well give a false sense of precision.  While the rules may 
be precise with bright-line tests on the finest minutia of financial reporting, the financial 
reporting itself remains subject to manipulation either through pure accounting choices or 
real activities manipulation.  Stringent guidance can reduce earnings management 
through manager’s judgments on accounting conditions; it may increase earnings 
management through real activities manipulation.  This conjecture is supported by several 
studies. 
 
Nelson et al. (2002) survey 253 audit partners on their experience with 515 attempts at 
earnings management by their clients and find a positive association between the 
precision of accounting rules and the structuring of transactions by managers.  The 
structuring of transactions allows managers to avoid infringement of specific provisions 
in the accounting standards, and ensures its acceptance by auditors.  Dye (2002) provides 
support for Nelsen et al. (2002) that stringent accounting standards will increase 
managers’ ability to manipulate financial reporting outcomes opportunistically, and thus 
weaken the effectiveness of the rigid standard. 
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Another survey paper by Graham et al. (2005) supports the notion that managers will 
sacrifice real economic earnings in order to meet their reporting objectives.  Under 
stringent accounting regulations, managers are overly concerned with accounting-based 
earnings management.  That is, managers emphasize that firms now go out of their way 
to assure shareholders that there is no accounting-based earnings management in their 
books.  Managers also express a corporate fear that even an appropriate accounting 
choice runs the risk of an overzealous regulator concluding ex post that accounting 
treatment is driven by an attempt to manage earnings (Graham et al. 2005).   
 
An analytical paper by Demski (2004) sketches a model with substitution between 
accounting and real earnings management.  He assumes that tighter standards reduce 
accounting earnings management, but increases real earnings management.  Along a 
similar line, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) examine the substitution effect between 
accounting earnings management and real manipulation.  Their model distinguishes 
between accounting and real earnings management and assume that a standard setter can 
only influence accounting earnings management by the tightness of standards.  They 
predict that managers increase costly real earnings management because the higher 
earnings quality increases the marginal benefit of real earnings management. 
 
The empirical evidence by Cohen et al. (2008) supports this conjecture.  They document 
that the time period with more flexible accounting standards (i.e., pre-SOX period) was 
characterized by high accounting-based earnings management and low real activities 
manipulation.  Following the passage of SOX (accounting standards becoming more 
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stringent), accounting-based earnings management decline significantly, while real 
earnings management increased significantly.  Consistent with the results of other 
studies, this evidence suggests that firms switched to managing earnings using real 
methods, possibly because these techniques, while more costly, are likely to be harder to 
detect. 
 
The evidence suggests that both rules-based and principles-based accounting standards 
have the strengths and weaknesses in terms of constraining earnings management.   
Hence, the agreement over the more effective accounting standards has not been reached. 
This inconclusive result may be due to the fact that all prior studies fail to consider other 
factors that may interact with accounting standards, such as institutional environments 
(e.g., short-term-focused versus long-term-oriented institutional investors).  I expect that 
with short-term-focused institutional investors (i.e., no monitoring mechanism), managers 
are more likely to switch from accounting-based earnings management to real activities 
manipulation when accounting standards become tighter, whereas with long-term-
oriented institutional investors (i.e., monitoring mechanisms exist), managers are less 
likely to switch from accounting-based earnings management to real activities 
manipulation.   
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2.4 Research Method 
2.4.1 Why Use an Experimental Approach? 
I use an experimental approach to examine the effects of accounting standards on 
managers’ earnings management decisions for the following reasons.  First, accounting 
standards are confounded in natural settings with other institutional factors such as legal 
systems.  It makes the archival results hard to interpret.  In contrast, an experiment is well 
suited to this task because a research setting that controls for other potentially influential 
variables can be constructed in a laboratory.   . 
 
In addition, an experimental method allows drawing causal inferences.  An experimental 
method is a more effective way to test the causal relationship between the time horizon of 
institutional investors and earnings management than archival study.  An archival study 
can only examine the association between institutional ownership and earnings 
management, but not the asserted causation.34  Moreover, in the laboratory, real earnings 
management can be clearly defined and is manipulated as a sub-optimal decision.  In 
contrast, the measures for real earnings manipulation are questionable in archival studies 
because it is infeasible to detect the sub-optimal decision given the fact that optimal 
decision is not observable in the real world setting.   
 
                                                 
 
 
34 Even though a few studies indicate that institutional investors constrain real earnings manipulation, it is 
plausible that what is being examined is the differential attractiveness of long-term versus short-term 
investments for institutional investors relative to all other types of stockholders.  That is, the long-term 
orientation of firms may attract long-term-oriented investors, while firms with short-term focus may attract 
short-term-focused investors.   
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2.4.2 Basic Setting 
Following Ewert and Wagenhofer’s (2005) proposition, stringent accounting standards 
imply a higher value relevance of  and .  Accordingly, I set  and  higher with 
stringent accounting standards than with flexible accounting standards.  The increase in 
the value relevance increases the marginal benefit of real activities manipulation and, in 
turn, the manager engages in more real activities manipulation in equilibrium.  In 
addition, I formalize stringent accounting standards by increasing the cost of accounting-
based earnings management (a).  In the extreme case, the disutility of engaging in 
accounting-based earnings management is equal to the disutility of real activities 
manipulation with flexible accounting standards.  The disutility of accounting-based 
earnings management increases when accounting standards become tighter.  Hence, I set 
a higher under stringent accounting standards condition.   
 
I assign parameters values as summarized in Table 2.1. 35   In addition, I set some 
restrictions to simplify the problem.  First, managers can only choose one type of 
earnings management.  This restriction helps better understand managers’ earnings 
management choices in different conditions.  Second, I restrict behavior such that 
managers engage in the optimal level of each type of earnings management because the 
managers would make the optimal decision in the light of the underlying utility function.  
Third, I examine the case in which the amount of earnings management is greater than 
zero because I assume that the manager’s incentive is to inflate the reported earnings (dA* 
                                                 
 
 
35 The detailed parameter selection process is presented in Appendix D.  The qualitative relationship within 
the payoff tables remains the same for any specific value that fulfills the requirement. 
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> 0; dR* > 0; dA* > 0; dR* > 0).  All conditions and corresponding equilibrium are 
summarized in Appendix B.  The payoff tables for all conditions are presented in 
Appendix C. 
 
Table 2.1: Summary of Notations and Parameter Values 








p (relative weight on current period price)  3.12 
c (real cost of real activities manipulation)  1 
Flexible Accounting Standards  
      1 (value relevance)  0.32 
      2 (value relevance)  0.11 
      2 (value relevance)  0.21 




Stringent Accounting Standards  
      1 (value relevance)  0.64 
      2 (value relevance)  0.22 
      2 (value relevance)  0.42 




Based on payoff tables provided in Appendix C, the equilibrium exists for each condition 
with short-term-focused institutional investors.  The short-term-focused institutional 
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investors always elect to sell his/her shares at the end of the first periods.  So there is no 
need to collect data for conditions with short-term-focused institutional investors.  
However, no optimal equilibrium exists for managers under conditions with long-term-
oriented institutional investors.  Therefore, the method of experimental economics is 
employed to test managers’ earnings management preference with long-term-oriented 
institutional investors under different conditions.  
 
2.4.3 Experimental Predictions 
I use the results for conditions with short-term-focused investors as a benchmark and 
compare them with the results from the experiment for conditions with long-term-
oriented institutional investors.  In conditions with short-term-focused institutional 
investors, long-term managers prefer accounting-based earnings management with 
flexible accounting standards, whereas short-term managers are indifferent to accounting-
based earnings management and real activities manipulation.  But according to other-
regarding preferences theory, short-term managers will choose accounting-based earnings 
management because it is less detrimental to the investors and the managers are 
indifferent.  When accounting standards become stringent, long-term managers prefer 
accounting-based earnings management, whereas short-term managers favor real 
activities manipulation.  Overall, managers favor accounting-based earnings management 
except the case with short-term managers and stringent accounting standards.  The results 
for conditions with short-term-focused institutional investors and the predictions for 











Result 1a: Managers are more likely to 
favor accounting-based earnings 
management with flexible accounting 
standards. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Managers are no more 
likely to favor accounting-based earnings 
management with flexible accounting 
standards. 
 
Result 1b: Managers are more likely to 
favor real activities manipulation with 
stringent accounting standards. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Managers are no more 
likely to choose real activities manipulation 
with stringent accounting standards. 
 
Result 1: Managers switch from accounting-based earnings management to real activities 
manipulation when accounting standards become more stringent in conditions with short-
term-focused institutional investors. 
 
Hypothesis 1(effects of accounting standards): Managers are not likely to switch from 
accounting-based earnings management to real activities manipulation when accounting 









Result 2a: Short-term managers are more 
likely to favor real activities manipulation 
than accounting-based earnings 
management. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Short-term managers are no 
more likely to favor real activities 
manipulation than accounting-based 
earnings management. 
 
Result 2b: Long-term managers are more 




Hypothesis 2b: Long-term managers are no 
more likely to favor accounting-based 
earnings management. 
 
Result 2: In conditions with short-term-focused institutional investors, short-term 
managers are more willing to engage in real activities manipulation than long-term 
managers. 
 
Hypothesis 2(effects of type of manager): In conditions with long-term-oriented 
institutional investors, short-term managers are less likely to favor real activities 
manipulation than long-term managers. 
 
 77 
2.4.4 Experiment Overview 
I use a one-shot, two-person experiment to test managers’ earnings management choices 
when monitored by long-term-oriented institutional investors.  I manipulate the tightness 
of accounting standards (flexible versus stringent) and type of manager (short-term 
versus long-term).  There are four conditions in total.  One half of the participants take 
the role of the manager and the other half that of the long-term oriented institutional 
investor.  Participants are randomly assigned their roles, which they maintain for the 
whole session (i.e., for all four conditions). 
 
It is a within-subjects design.  Fifty-eight students participate in the experiment, resulting 
in 29 pairs.  Each pair of participants individually chooses an action from a payoff table, 
which summarizes the effects of the flexibility of accounting standards and type of 
manager on managers’ earnings management choices as well as institutional investors’ 
monitoring activities.  All participants are provided with the same set of payoff tables: 
one for each experimental condition.   
 
The game is played simultaneously.  Managers can choose one of three options in the 
first period: (1) no earnings management, (2) accounting-based earnings management, or 
(3) real activities manipulation.  All long-term-oriented institutional investors have three 
options: (1) do not investigate, (2) investigate accounting-based earnings management, or 
(3) investigate real activities manipulation.  Option 2 and 3 give long-term-oriented 
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institutional investors monitoring ability.36  If investors choose to investigate accounting-
based earnings management (real activities manipulation), accounting-based earnings 
management (real activities manipulation) cannot be taken.  In other words, the 
monitoring activities of long-term-oriented institutional investors prevent such behavior 
from occurring. 
 
The participants are recruited from a medium sized U.S. university.  Participants are 
comprised mostly of undergraduates (91 percent), with an average age of 21 years.  More 
than half of the participants (52 percent) are pursuing a program of study in business. 
 
2.4.5 Procedures 
All participants are in the same room.  But the participants are physically separated 
(spread out) and no communication is permitted.  Players do not know other players’ 
roles.  Envelopes containing instructions for the experiment are randomly distributed to 
the participants, and informed consents are obtained.  The experimenter reads the 
instruction aloud.  Participants then are required to complete a quiz to ensure the 
understanding of the experiment.  The instruction is presented in Appendix E.   
 
After completing the quiz, participants privately learn their roles and start making 
decisions.  Participants are not given the phrases such as managers and investors in the 
experiment.  Participants who act as managers and long-term-oriented investors only 
                                                 
 
 
36 I do not impose costs on the monitoring activities because the costs of institutional monitoring activities 
will eventually pass to the company and other investors. 
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learn that they are players X and Y, respectively.  The experiment is framed in abstract 
terms because a rich setting may introduce confounds. 
 
All participants are provided with four payoff tables37 (see Appendix C) corresponding to 
condition 5 to 8 in Appendix C (i.e., all conditions with long-term-oriented institutional 
investors).  The payoff tables present both players’ payoffs for each decision 
combination.  In addition, I employ a Graeco-Latin square design to randomize the 
sequence of the payoff tables in order to control for order effects.  The decisions are 
recorded on a decision sheet.  A helper collects the decision sheets and takes them to a 
student assistant located in an office.  The student assistant randomly matches player X 
and player Y, and then determines each participant’s payoff and puts cash in envelopes 
which have participant numbers written on the outside.  The helper returns to the room 
and distributes the envelopes.38 
 
While participants are waiting for the helper to return, a post-experiment questionnaire is 
administered.  The questionnaire is used to collect demographics and other information 
that may provide insight into participants’ decisions.  The experimental sessions last 
approximately 30 minutes, for which participants earn an average of $15.   
 
                                                 
 
 
37 All payoffs in the payoff tables are in points, not real monetary payoffs.  But the monetary payoff is 
directly related the points listed in the payoff tables. 
38 In addition to experimental earnings, participants are paid a $5 show-up fee. 
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2.5 Results 
In order to better understand managers’ earnings management choices, I first present 
results for long-term-oriented institutional investors’ monitoring activities because the 
earnings management strategy adopted by managers is influenced by institutional 
monitoring activities.  The results on managers’ earnings management decisions are 
document in the next section.  
 
2.5.1 Long-term-oriented Institutional Investors’ Monitoring Activities 
Panel A of Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics of the frequency of each type of 
monitoring activity.  Figure 2.1 presents the frequency of institutional investors’ 
monitoring activities.  The results suggest that long-term-oriented institutional investors 
are more likely to constrain real activities manipulation.39   The only exception is in 
condition 6 (flexible accounting standards and long-term managers), in which case 
institutional investors are more likely to limit accounting-based earnings management.40  
The results arise because, in general, institutional investors are more likely to monitor 
real activities manipulation due to the detrimental effects of such activities.  However, in 
condition 6, the detrimental effects of real activities manipulation are insignificant to 
institutional investors because the optimal level of real activities manipulation is low.  
                                                 
 
 
39  In condition 5, 2 (7%) and 27 (93%) participants choose to investigate accounting-based earnings 
management and real activities manipulation, respectively.  In condition 7, 3 (10%) and 25 (86%) 
participants choose to investigate accounting-based earnings management and real activities manipulation, 
respectively.  In condition 8, 4 (14%) and 23 (79%) participants choose to investigate accounting-based 
earnings management and real activities manipulation, respectively.    
40 In condition 6, 20 (69%) and 7 (24%) participants choose to investigate accounting-based earnings 
management and real activities manipulation, respectively.   
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Although the marginal cost of real activities manipulation is constant across different 
conditions, the total effects of real activities manipulation are not detrimental in condition 
6 because the optimal amount of real activities manipulation is extremely lower.  The low 
optimal level of real activities manipulation are due to (1) real activities manipulation 
have a detrimental effect on long-term managers’ payoffs, so managers themselves have 
less incentive to engage in real activities manipulation; (2) with flexible accounting 
standards, cost of engaging in accounting-based earnings management is cheaper.  Hence, 
accounting-based earnings management is a preferable type of earnings management to 
managers.  All in all, institutional investors have less incentive to constrain real activities 
manipulation if managers are unlikely to engage in real activities manipulation. 
 
 82 
Table 2.2 Panel A: Empirical Frequency Table for Observed Behavior of Long-term-





 Long-term Manager 
(Condition 6) 
 Flexible Accounting 
Standards – All 
Managers 
NO IA IR  NO IA IR  NO IA IR 
0 2 27  2 20 7  2 22 34 
(0%) (7%) (93%)  (7%) (69%) (24%)  (3%) (38%) (59%) 




 Long-term Manager 
(Condition 8) 
 Stringent Accounting 
Standards – All 
Managers 
NO IA IR  NO IA IR  NO IA IR 
1 3 25  2 4 23  3 7 48 
(4%) (10%) (86%)  (7%) (14%) (79%)  (5%) (12%) (83%) 
       
Short-term Managers – 
Both Accounting 
Standards 
 Long-term Managers – 
Both Accounting 
Standards 
 Total   
NO IA IR  NO IA IR  NO IA IR 
1 5 52  4 24 30  5 29 82 
(2%) (9%) (89%)  (7%) (41%) (52%)  (4%) (25%) (71%) 
 
Panel B: Statistical Tests on the Difference between Investigating Accounting-based 
Earnings Management and Investigating Real Activities Manipulation 
Effects of  Accounting Standards on A and R 
Flexible vs. Stringent  Chi-Square P-value (Two -tailed) 
  10.141 0.001 
    
Effects of Type of Manager on A and R 
Short vs. Long  Chi-Square P-value (Two -tailed) 
  18.283 0.000 
Notes: NO: Do Not Investigation; IA: Investigate Accounting-based Earnings 





Figure 2.1 - Empirical Frequency Graph of Institutional Investors’ Monitoring Activities 




Condition 5 Flexible Accounting Standards and Short-term Managers 
 
Condition 6 Flexible Accounting Standards and Long-term Managers 
 
Condition 7 Stringent Accounting Standards and Short-term Managers 
 
Condition 8 Stringent Accounting Standards and Long-term Managers 
 
 
NO Do Not Investigate 
 
IA  Investigate Accounting-based Earnings Management 
 
IR Investigate Real Activities Manipulation 
 

















Next, I use multinomial logit regression to test the effects of flexibility of accounting 
standards (flexible versus stringent), type of manager (short-term versus long-term), and 
the interaction term on institutional investors’ monitoring activities.  The dependent 
variable is institutional investors’ monitoring choice (i.e., do not investigate, investigate 
accounting-based earnings management, and investigate real activities manipulation).  
The results from the multinomial logit model are presented in Table 2.3.  The results 
indicate that type of manager has a significant effect on institutional investors’ choices of 
monitoring activities (Wald = 18.278; p < 0.000).  In addition, I find a significant 
interaction between flexibility of accounting standards and type of manager (Wald = 
7.709; p = 0.003).  The significant interaction effect arises mainly due to condition 6, in 
which participants (acting as institutional investors) are more likely to investigate 
accounting-based earnings management.  In all other conditions, participants are more 
likely to investigate real activities manipulation. 
 
Table 2.3: Multinomial Logit Regression of Long-term-oriented Institutional Investors’ 
Monitoring Activities 
Dependent Variable = Institutional 







Intercept -2.603 0.733 12.614 0.000  
Accounting Standards 0.482 0.954 0.256 0.307 1.620 
Manager 3.653 0.854 18.278 0.000 38.571 
Accounting Standards 
by Manager 
-3.281 1.182 7.709 0.003 0.038 









Pseudo R2 31.4% 
Note: The reference category is Real Activities Manipulation. 
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Further, I focus on examining two types of monitoring activities (i.e., investigate 
accounting-based earnings management and investigate real activities manipulation) 
rather than all three choices that are available to participants, which include no 
investigation and two types of monitoring activities, because the choice of two types of 
monitoring activities helps explain managers’ earnings management choices (i.e., 
accounting-based earnings management versus real activities manipulation). 
 
2.5.1.1 Effects of Accounting Standards  
I examine the effects of flexibility of accounting standards on two types of monitoring 
activities (investigate accounting-based earnings management versus investigate real 
activities manipulation).  The results reported in Panel A of Table 2.2 indicate that with 
flexible accounting standards, 34 (59%) participants acting as institutional investors 
constrain real activities manipulation.  With stringent accounting standards, 48 (83%) 
participants constrain real activities manipulation.  The results presented in Panel B of 
Table 2.2 suggest that long-term-oriented institutional investors are more likely to 
constrain real activities manipulation with stringent accounting standards than with 
flexible accounting standards (2 = 10.141; p = 0.001). 
 
2.5.1.2 Effects of Type of Manager  
I investigate the effects of type of manager on two types of monitoring activities 
(investigate accounting-based earnings management versus investigate real activities 
manipulation).  As reported in Panel A of Table 2.2, the results suggest that with short-
term managers, 52 (89%) participants acting as institutional investors constrain real 
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activities manipulation.  With long-term managers, 30 (52%) participants constrain real 
activities manipulation.  The results presented in Panel B of Table 2.2 suggest that long-
term-oriented institutional investors are more likely to monitor real activities 
manipulation in conditions with short-term managers than in conditions with long-term 
managers (2 = 18.283; p < 0.001). 
 
2.5.2 Managers’ Earnings Management Choices 
 
2.5.2.1 Effects of Flexibility of Accounting Standards and Type of Manager on 
Managers’ Earnings Management Choices 
 
Panel A of Table 2.4 presents descriptive statistics of the frequency of participants’ 
earnings management choices.  Figure 2.2 presents the frequency of managers’ choices of 
earnings management.  Multinomial logit regression is employed to test the effects of 
accounting standards (flexible versus stringent), type of manager (short-term versus long-
term), and the interaction term on managers’ earnings management choices.  The results 
reported in Panel A of Table 2.5 indicate that the effect of flexibility of accounting 
standards on managers’ earnings management choice is marginally significant (Wald = 
2.219; p = 0.068) and type of manager is significant (Wald = 7.286; p = 0.004), but the 
interaction term is insignificant. 
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Table 2.4: Panel A: Empirical Frequency Table for Observed Behavior of Managers’ 





 Long-term Manager 
(Condition 6) 
 Flexible Accounting 
Standards – All 
Managers 
N A R  N A R  N A R 
6 17 6  5 8 16  11 25 22 
(21%) (58%) (21%)  (17%) (28%) (55%)  (19%) (43%) (38%) 




 Long-term Manager 
(Condition 8) 
 Stringent Accounting 
Standards – All 
Managers 
N A R  N A R  N A R 
6 21 2  3 18 8  9 39 10 
(21%) (72%) (7%)  (11%) (62%) (27%)  (16%) (67%) (17%) 
       
Short-term Managers – 
Both Accounting 
Standards 
 Long-term Managers – 
Both Accounting 
Standards 
 Total   
N A R  N A R  N A R 
12 38 8  8 26 24  20 64  32 
(20%) (66%) (14%)  (14%) (45%) (41%)  (17%) (55%) (28%) 
 
Panel B: Statistical Tests on the Difference between Accounting-based Earnings 
Management and Real Activities Manipulation 
Effects of  Accounting Standards on A and R 
Flexible vs. Stringent  Chi-Square P-value (Two -tailed) 
  7.524 0.006 
    
Effects of Type of Manager on A and R 
Short vs. Long  Chi-Square P-value (Two -tailed) 
  10.101 0.001 
Note: N: No Earnings Management; A: Accounting-based Earnings Management; R: 







Figure 2.2 - Empirical Frequency Graph of Managers’ Earnings Management Choices for 
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Condition 6 Flexible Accounting Standards and Long-term Managers 
 
Condition 7 Stringent Accounting Standards and Short-term Managers 
 
Condition 8 Stringent Accounting Standards and Long-term Managers 
 
 
N No Earnings Management 
 
A  Accounting-based Earnings Management 
 
R Real Activities Manipulation 
 
 

















Table 2.5 Panel A: Multinomial Logit Regression of Managers’ Earnings Management 
Choices 
Dependent Variable = Managers’ 







Intercept 0.811 0.425 3.642 0.028  
Accounting Standards -1.310 0.879 2.219 0.068 0.270 
Manager 1.735 0.643 7.286 0.004 5.667 
Accounting Standards 
by Manager 
-0.194 1.068 0.033 0.428 0.101 









Pseudo R2 16.7% 
 
Panel B: Multinomial Logit Regression of Managers’ Earnings Management Choices – 
Short-term Managers 








Accounting Standards -1.310 0.879 2.219 0.068 0.270 
 
Panel C: Multinomial Logit Regression of Managers’ Earnings Management Choices – 
Long-term Managers 








Accounting Standards -1.504 0.607 6.146 0.007 0.222 




I further examine the effects of accounting standards on managers’ earnings management 
choice under conditions with different types of managers.  As presented in Panel B of 
Table 2.5, the results indicate that the effects of flexibility of accounting standards on 
managers’ earnings management choice are marginally significant under conditions with 
short-term managers (Wald = 2.219; p = 0.068).  Results reported in Panel C of Table 2.5 
suggest that the effect of type of manager on managers’ earnings management choice is 
significant under conditions with long-term managers (Wald = 6.146; p = 0.007).  The 
findings indicate that the marginal significant main effect of flexibility of accounting 
standards is driven by the results from the conditions with short-term managers. 
 
2.5.2.1.1 Effects of Accounting Standards  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that managers are not likely to switch from accounting-based 
earnings management to real activities manipulation when accounting standards become 
more stringent in conditions with long-term-oriented institutional investors.  Hence, I 
compare the choices of accounting-based earnings management and real activities 
manipulation with different accounting standards.  In support of Hypothesis 1, as Panel B 
of Table 2.4 indicates, more managers choose real activities manipulation with flexible 
accounting standards than with stringent accounting standards (2 = 7.524, p = 0.006).   
 
The descriptive statistics presented in Panel A of Table 2.4 show that with flexible 
accounting standards, 25 (43%) and 22 (38%) participants choose accounting-based 
earnings management and real activities manipulation, respectively.  Compared to the 
corresponding conditions with short-term-focused institutional investors, managers with 
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flexible accounting standards are less likely to choose accounting-based earnings 
management.  However, accounting-based earnings management is still the most likely 
earnings management method.  Hence, Hypothesis 1a is partially supported.  With 
stringent accounting standards, 39 (67%) and 10 (17%) participants choose accounting-
based earnings management and real activities manipulation, respectively.  The result is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1b that managers do not favor real activities manipulation. 
 
2.5.2.1.2 Effects of Type of Manager  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that in conditions with long-term-oriented institutional investors, 
short-term managers are less likely to choose real activities manipulation than long-term 
managers.  Hence, I compare the choices of accounting-based earnings management and 
real activities manipulation for different types of managers.  In support of Hypothesis 2, 
the results presented in Panel B of Table 2.4 indicate that short-term managers are less 
likely to choose real activities manipulation than long-term managers (2 = 10.101; p = 
0.001).   
 
The results reported in Panel A of Table 2.4 show that short-term managers are more 
likely to choose accounting-based earnings management than real activities manipulation 
(A = 66%, R = 14%), which is consistent with Hypothesis 2a.  Although accounting-
based earnings management is the most likely earnings management choice (A = 45%, R 
= 41%), long-term managers are less likely to choose accounting-based earnings 
management compared to the corresponding benchmark conditions.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2b is partially supported. 
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2.5.2.2 Further Analysis - Results for Each Condition 
I further examine the results in each condition with long-term-oriented institutional 
investors, and then compare the results with those in the benchmark conditions.  Figure 
2.1 presents the frequency of managers’ choice on each type of earnings management 
from conditions with long-term-oriented institutional investors.  The figure indicates that 
managers are more likely to choose accounting-based earnings management than real 
activities manipulation in all conditions except for condition 6 (flexible accounting 
standards and long-term managers).  These findings arise because institutional investors 
generally are more likely to constrain real activities manipulation except for condition 6, 
in which institutional investors are more likely to monitor accounting-based earnings 
management.41  As a result, managers are less likely to choose accounting-based earnings 
management in this condition.  Managers’ most likely earnings management choice for 
each condition is reported in Table 2.6 (in comparison to the corresponding benchmark 
result). 
 
                                                 
 
 
41 Institutional investors anticipate that, with flexible accounting standards and long-term managers, the 
most likely earning management method is accounting-based earnings management.   
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Table 2.6: Managers’ Favorable Earnings Management Choices 
 Short-term-focused 
Institutional Investors 























































































As reported in Panel A of Table 2.4, managers in condition 5 (flexible accounting 
standards, short-term managers, and long-term-oriented institutional investors) prefer 
accounting-based earnings management to real activities manipulation (A = 58%; R = 
21%).  In condition 6 (flexible accounting standards, long-term managers, and long-term-
oriented institutional investors), managers are more likely to choose real activities 
manipulation than accounting-based earnings management (A = 28%; R = 55%).  
Managers in condition 7 (stringent accounting standards, short-term managers, and long-
term-oriented institutional investors) prefer accounting-based earnings management to 
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real activities manipulation (A = 72%; R = 7%).  In condition 8 (stringent accounting 
standards, long-term managers, and long-term-oriented institutional investors), managers 
are more willing to choose accounting-based earnings management than real activities 
manipulation (A = 62%; R = 27%).   
 
The findings from condition 5 and 8 are consistent with those from the corresponding 
benchmark condition 1 (flexible accounting standards, short-term managers, and long-
term-oriented institutional investors) and condition 4 (stringent accounting standards, 
long-term managers, and short-term-focused institutional investors), respectively.  In 
these conditions, managers are more likely to choose accounting-based earnings 
management than real activities manipulation.  The results arise because long-term-
oriented institutional investors are more likely to constrain real activities manipulation. 
 
However, the results from condition 6 are different than those from condition 2 (flexible 
accounting standards, long-term managers, and short-term-focused institutional 
investors).  Managers in condition 6 (condition 2) are more likely to choose real activities 
manipulation (accounting-based earnings management) than accounting-based earnings 
management (real activities manipulation).  The inconsistent results are driven by the 
difference of institutional investors’ investment horizon.  Long-term-oriented institutional 
investors are more likely to constrain accounting-based earnings management because the 
most likely earning management method is accounting-based earnings management with 
flexible accounting standards and long-term managers.  More importantly, the 
detrimental effects of real activities manipulation are insignificant to institutional 
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investors because the optimal level of real activities manipulation is low. 42  
Consequently, institutional investors have more incentive to constrain accounting-based 
earnings management rather than real activities manipulation. 
 
The findings from condition 7 are different than those from baseline condition 3 
(stringent accounting standards, short-term managers, and short-term-focused 
institutional investors).  With long-term-oriented institutional investors, short-term 
managers are more likely to choose accounting-based earnings management than real 
activities manipulation because long-term-oriented institutional investors are more likely 
to constrain real activities manipulation in this condition.43 
                                                 
 
 
42 Although the marginal cost of real activities manipulation is constant across different conditions, the total 
effects of real activities manipulation are not detrimental in condition 6 because the optimal amount of real 
activities manipulation is extremely lower.  The low optimal level of real activities manipulation are due to 
(1) the detrimental effects of real activities manipulation have impact on long-term managers’ payoffs, so 
managers themselves have less incentive to engage in real activities manipulation; (2) with flexible 
accounting standards, cost of engaging in accounting-based earnings management is cheaper. 
43 Institutional investors are more likely to constrain real activities manipulation because (1) real activities 
manipulation has the detrimental effect on the long-term-oriented investors’ payoff; (2) real activities 
manipulation is the most likely earnings management method without the presence of the institutional 
monitoring. 
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2.6 Summary and conclusion 
A body of prior literature (e.g., Dechow and Skinner 2000; Nelson et al. 2002) is devoted 
to documenting accounting-based earnings management.  However, the recent survey 
conducted by Graham et al. (2005) shows that many managers use real activities 
manipulation rather than accounting-based earnings management to window dress the 
financial statements.  The unwillingness of managers to use accounting-based earnings 
management in recent years is partly attributed to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which 
imposes tightening accounting regulations and rules on firms.  The core concern in this 
paper is that the legislative and regulatory response treats the symptoms (means) rather 
than the disease (motivation) because the constraints on accounting-based earnings 
management may cause managers to switch to real activities manipulation.   
 
The prior studies (e.g., Demski 2004; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005; Graham et al. 2005; 
Cohen et al. 2008) provide evidence that managers switch from accounting-based 
earnings management to real activities manipulation with tightening accounting 
standards.  The paper extends this line of literature and examines the effects of flexibility 
of accounting standards on managers’ earnings management behavior across different 
institutional environments and with different managers’ compensation schemes.  The 
findings suggest that with short-term-focused institutional investors, managers are more 
likely to switch from accounting-based earnings management to real activities 
manipulation when accounting standards become tighter.  The results are consistent with 
the prior evidence.   
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However, in presence of a long-term-oriented institutional monitoring mechanism, 
managers are no more likely to switch from accounting-based earnings management to 
real activities manipulation with tightening accounting standards.  The results suggest 
that managers engage in more real activities manipulation in response to tightening 
accounting standards only when institutional investors have a short investment horizon.  
 
In addition, the findings suggest that with short-term-focused institutional investors, 
managers are more likely to engage in real activities manipulation when their payoffs are 
only tied to current-period earnings (short-term managers) than when their payoffs are 
related to both current-period earnings as well as long-term performance of the firm 
(long-term managers).  However, with long-term-oriented institutional investors, short-
term managers are less likely to choose real activities manipulation than long-term 
managers because a long-term-oriented institutional monitoring mechanism deters short-
term managers from choosing real activities manipulation.   
 
Furthermore, long-term-oriented institutional investors take a more active role to 
constrain earnings management than short-term-focused institutional investors.  
Specifically, long-term-oriented institutional investors generally are more likely to 
constrain real activities manipulation because of the detrimental effect of real activities 
manipulation.   
 
This dissertation contributes to understanding the implications of flexibility of accounting 
standards on the level of accounting-based earnings management and real activities 
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manipulation.  A conclusion on which accounting standard (rules-based or principles-
based accounting standard) is more effective cannot be reached without considering other 
factors such as managers’ compensation schemes and institutional investors’ monitoring 
activities.  These results have implications for regulators, practitioners, and academics.  
In order to effectively constrain earnings management, besides changing the flexibility of 
accounting standards, constructing a long-term-oriented institutional environment is 
required.  Additionally, this dissertation sheds lights on the effects of managers’ 
compensation schemes on earnings management behavior.  When managers’ payoffs are 
related to long-term performance of the firm, they are more likely to self-constrain real 
activities manipulation. 
 
One limitation of this study is that only single motivation for earnings management, 
which is a compensation contract.  In reality, many other factors could drive earnings 
management such as avoiding violations of debt covenants and smoothing earnings.  The 
second limitation is that my experiment does not permit the prices to be endogenously 
determined by the market.   Future research can enrich this experiment by incorporating a 
more dynamic market setting.  That is, let the experimental market determine the prices. 
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APPENDIX A: Variables required for my analysis and corresponding COMPUSTAT 
data items 
ASSETS Total assets = data6 
SALES Net sales = data12 
IBEI Earnings before extra-ordinary items = data18 
COGS Cost of goods sold = data41 
PPE Plant, Property and Equipment = data107 
CFO Cash flow from operations = data308 
ACCR Total accruals = Earnings - Cash flow from operations = data18 – data308 
EXP Discretionary expenses = R&D + Advertising + SG&A = data46 + data45 + 
data189 
RD R&D expenses = data46 
SG&A Selling, General and Administrative expenses, excluding R&D = data189 – 
data46 
Funds Internal funds = IBEI + R&D + Depreciation = data18 + data46 + data14 
TobinsQ (MV + Book value of preferred stock + Long-term debt + Short-term debt) / 
Total assets = (data199*data25 + data130 + data9 + data34) / data6 
CapitalExp Capital expenditure = data128 
DS Dummy variable; 1 if income decreasing, 0 otherwise 
PROD COGS + Inventory = data41 + data3 
SIZE Logarithm of total assets = log (data6) 
MTB Logarithm of  Market-to-book ratio = log (MV/BV) = log 
(data199*data25/data216) 
NI Net income = data172/data25*data199 
ABDAC 
1 1 1 1 2 1/ *(1/ ) *( / ) *( / )t t t t t t t tACCR A A S A PPE Aα β β ε− − − −= + ∆ + +  
where, A = Total assets;  
            S = Change in sales over last period’s sales; 
            PPE = Property, plant and equipment; 
            ACCR = Total accruals. 
This equation is estimated for every industry and year with at least 15 
observations.  The error term in the model represents the unexplained or 
discretionary component of accruals.  ABDAC is the absolute value of the 
error term. 
ABCFO 
1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1/ *(1/ ) ( / ) ( / )t t t t t t t tCFO A A S A S Aα α β β ε− − − −= + + + ∆ +  
where,  CFO= Cash flow from operations;  
  S = Net sales; 
  A= Total assets. 
This equation is estimated for every industry and year with at least 15 
observations.  The error term in the model represents abnormal cash flow 
from operations (ABCFO).  
ABEXP 
1 0 1 1 1 1/ *(1/ ) ( / )t t t t t tEXP A A S Aα α β ε− − − −= + + +  
where, EXP = Discretionary expenses = R&D + Advertising  
             + Selling, General and Administrative expenses; 
             S = Net sales; 
             A= Total assets. 
This equation is estimated for every industry and year with at least 15 
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observations.  The error term in the model represents abnormal discretionary 
expenses (ABCFO). 
ABPROD 
1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 1/ *(1/ ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )t t t t t t t t t tPROD A A S A S A S Aα α β β β ε− − − − − −= + + + ∆ + ∆ +  
where, Prod = Production costs = COGS + Inventory; 
 S = Net sales; 
 St = Change in sales over last period’s sales. 
This equation is estimated for every industry and year with at least 15 
observations.  The error term in the model represents abnormal production 
costs (ABPROD). 
ABRD 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 4 1/ ( / ) ( / ) * * /t t t t t t t t tRD A RD A Funds A TobinsQ CapitalExp Aα β β β β ε− − − − −= + + + + +  
where, RD = R&D expense; 
 A = Total assets; 
 Funds = Internal funds = IBEI + R&D + Depreciation; 
 TobinsQ = the sum of market value of equity, book value of preferred 
stock,  
            long-term debt, and short-term debt, scaled by total assets; 
 CapitalExp = Capital expenditure. 
This equation is estimated for every industry and year with at least 15 







































































where, SG&A = SG&A expenses – R&D expenses;  
             S = Net Sales; 
             DS = Dummy for decreasing sales that equals 1 if sales are 
decreasing,  
             0 otherwise. 
This equation is estimated for every industry and year with at least 15 
observations.  The error term in the model represents abnormal SG&A 
(ABSGA). 
PDAC The predicted value of ABDAC from the first stage regression 
Mktshare Auditors’ market shares = Total assets of all clients in a certain industry 
audited by a particular auditor / Total assets of all clients in that industry 
SPEL Industry specialist auditors = Auditors with a market share in excess of (1 






Sample that includes firms that just meet analysts’ forecasts 
Forecast Error = Forecasts earnings – Actual earnings = 0 
where, Forecast earnings = Median of the most recent forecast earnings 
Second 
Sample 
Sample that includes firm-years before issuance of new equities 
If data108 > 0 in year t+1 
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APPENDIX B: All Conditions and Corresponding Equilibrium  
Condition  Optimal Equilibrium  
1 Flexible Accounting Standards, 
Short-term Managers, and Short-
term-focused Institutional Investors 
X chooses accounting-based earnings 
management 
Y chooses to exit the market at the end of 
the first period 
 
2 Flexible Accounting Standards, 
Long-term Managers, and Short-
term-focused Institutional Investors 
X chooses accounting-based earnings 
management 
Y chooses to exit the market at the end of 
the first period 
 
3 Stringent Accounting Standards, 
Short-term Managers, and Short-
term-focused Institutional Investors 
 
X chooses real activities manipulation 
Y chooses to exit the market at the end of 
the first period 
 
4 Stringent Accounting Standards, 
Long-term Managers, and Short-
term-focused Institutional Investors 
X chooses accounting-based earnings 
management 
Y chooses to exit the market at the end of 
the first period 
 
5 Flexible Accounting Standards, 
Short-term Managers, and Long-
term-oriented Institutional Investors 
 
Mixed Strategy 
6 Flexible Accounting Standards, 
Long-term Managers, and Long-
term-oriented Institutional Investors 
 
Mixed Strategy 
7 Stringent Accounting Standards, 
Short-term Managers, and Long-
term-oriented Institutional Investors 
 
Mixed Strategy 
8 Stringent Accounting Standards, 
Long-term Managers, and Long-








APPENDIX C: Payoff Tables (Short-term-focused institutional investors have all four 
options.  Long-term-oriented institutional investors do not have ‘Exit’ option) 
 
Flexible Accounting Standards - Short-term managers  
Player X’s Options 
 
                             Player X’s Options 
 
Player Y’s Options Action N Action A 
 
Action R 
Exit X = 79 
Y = 131 
 
X = 87 
Y = 164 
X = 87 
Y = 164 
Accept All Actions X = 79 
Y = 131 
X = 87 
Y = 121 
X = 87 
Y = 99 
 
Investigate Action A X = 79 
Y = 131 
X = 70 
Y = 131 
X = 87 








Investigate Action R X = 79 
Y = 131 
 
X = 87 
Y = 121 
X = 70 
Y = 131 
 
Flexible Accounting Standards - Long-term managers 
Player X’s Options 
 
                             Player X’s Options 
 
Player Y’s Options Action N 
 
Action A Action R 
Exit X = 104 
Y = 131 
 
X = 109 
Y = 155 
X = 105 
Y = 136 
Accept All Actions X = 104 
Y = 131 
X = 109 
Y = 123 
X = 105 
Y = 126 
 
Investigate Action A X = 104 
Y = 131 
X = 99 
Y = 131 
X = 105 








Investigate Action R X = 104 
Y = 131 
X = 109 
Y = 123 
X = 104 
Y = 131 
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Stringent Accounting Standards - Short-term managers  
Player X’s Options 
 
                             Player X’s Options 
 
Player Y’s Options Action N 
 
Action A Action R 
Exit X = 99 
Y = 291 
X = 105 
Y = 332 
X = 112 
Y = 373 
 
Accept All Actions X = 99 
Y = 291 
X = 105 
Y = 278 
X = 112 
Y = 212 
 
Investigate Action A X = 99 
Y = 291 
X = 92 
Y = 291 
X = 112 








Investigate Action R X = 99 
Y = 291 
X = 105 
Y = 278 
X = 86 
Y = 291 
 
 
Stringent Accounting Standards - Long-term managers 
Player X’s Options 
 
                             Player X’s Options 
 
Player Y’s Options Action N 
 
Action A Action R 
Exit X = 130 
Y = 291 
 
X = 134 
Y = 322 
X = 132 
Y = 308 
Accept All Actions X = 130 
Y = 291 
X = 134 
Y = 281 
 
X = 132 
Y = 274 
Investigate Action A X = 130 
Y = 291 
X = 127 
Y = 291 
X = 132 








Investigate Action R X = 130 
Y = 291 
X = 134 
Y = 281 
X = 130 
Y = 291 
 
 
Note: The bolded choices in the above tables are the equilibrium in the conditions with 
short-term-focused institutional investors. 
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APPENDIX D: Parameter Selections 
I randomly generate parameter s but it has to fulfill the following criteria: s – 1 > 0;  
The discount rate can be randomly selected because all results are qualitatively similar as 
long as the manager’s and the market’s discount rates are identical (Sunkar and 
Subramanyam 2001).  I set p = s because both are essentially discount rates.   
 
 is a random variable generated between –(dA* + dR*) and 0.  I set the market’s beliefs of 
earnings management are smaller than the actual earnings management because prior 
literature documents that market typically cannot fully anticipant and adjust the reporting 
bias. 
 
2 and 2 with flexible accounting standards are randomly selected.  Then, I 
set 221 γββ += , implying that reported earnings in the two periods are equally 
informative with respect to the liquidating dividend.  With stringent accounting 
standards, all value relevance parameters (2, 2 and 2) are assumed doubled.   
 
c is randomly selected, but it has to be large enough to show the detrimental effect of real 
activities manipulation.  That is, with stringent accounting standards, long-term managers 
are expected to take less real activities manipulation than accounting-based earnings 
management (i.e., dA* > dR*).   
 
All randomly selected parameters have to meet the following requirements: dA* > 0; dR* > 
0; 0;0;0;0 >>>> longinvshortinvlongmgrshortmgr UUUU  
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 = -1.16; s = p = 3.12;  
Flexible Accounting Standards 
1 = 0.32; 2 = 0.11; 2 = 0.21; a = 1 
Stringent Accounting Standards 
1 = 0.64; 2 = 0.22; 2 = 0.42; a = 2 
 
The optimal level of each of earnings management is presented below: 








dA* = 4.12 
 
dR* = 4.12 
 
dA* = 2.56 
 
dR* = 5.12 
Long-term Managers dA* = 3.02 
 
dR* = 0.60 
 
dA* = 1.96 
 






APPENDIX E: Instructions  
Thank you for participating in this experiment.  After the experiment begins, please do 
not communicate with other participants.  If you have a question, please raise your hand 
and I will answer your question individually. 
 
Roles 
In this experiment you will perform a simple decision task that involves two people -- 
call them players X and Y.  All participants in this experiment are allocated to one of two 
groups: the group of players X and the group of players Y.  Your role will be announced 




Players X and players Y make decisions simultaneously based on the payoff tables 
(provided later).  Each player makes a series of decisions.  At the end of the experiment, 
each player X is randomly paired with a player Y.  One of the decisions is randomly 
selected and used to determine each player’s payoff in the pair. 
 
Anonymity and Privacy 
In the experiment, no player will know the identity of the player with whom s/he is 
paired.  All your decisions are completely anonymous.  No one, including the 
experimenter, will be able to link your decisions to your name.  At the end of the 
experiment, your monetary payoff will be given to you in a sealed envelope, with only 
your participant number printed on the envelope.     
 
Procedures  
Player X has the following three options: (1) Action N, (2) Action A, and (3) Action R.  
Player X can only choose one of the three options.  Player Y has three options: (1) 
Accept any actions chosen by player X, (2) Reject Action A, and (3) Reject Action R.  
Player Y can only choose one of the three options. 
 
The payoffs of players X and Y are jointly determined by both players’ decisions.  The 
payoff tables are provided later.  The numbers in the payoff tables are in points.  The 




each tablein get can you  points Minimum - each tablein get can you  points Maximum
each tablein get can you  points Minimum - each tablein get you  points actual The ×
 
 
In addition to the earnings converted from your points, you will also receive a 






Please complete this quiz to make sure you have a complete and accurate understanding 
of instructions as well as the payoff tables.  After you have completed the quiz, the 
experimenter will check your answers and discuss with you any questions that have been 
answered incorrectly.   
 
Playoff Table for Both Players (Note: This table is solely for practice purposes and 
is different from the actual table you will be using in the experimental task.)44 
 
  Player X’s  Options 
  Action N Action A Action R 
Accept All Actions X = 12 
Y = 150 
X = 116 
Y = 200 
X = 130 
Y = 500 
Reject Action A X = 113 
Y = 250 
X = 12 
Y = 120 
X = 220 
Y = 200 
Player Y’s 
Options 
Reject Action R X = 212 
Y = 200 
X = 313 
Y = 200 
X = 65 
Y = 300 
 
Assume Player X chooses Action R and Player Y chooses Reject Action R, what is the 
payoff for each player (Please fill in the blanks): 
 
Player X’s payoff (in points): __________ 
Player Y’s payoff (in points): __________ 
 
Assume Player X chooses Action A and Player Y chooses Reject Action R, what is the 
payoff for each player (Please fill in the blanks): 
 
Player X’s payoff (in points): __________ 
Player Y’s payoff (in points): __________ 
 
Assume Player X chooses Action A and Player Y chooses Reject Action A, what is the 
payoff for each player (Please fill in the blanks): 
 
Player X’s payoff (in points): __________ 
Player Y’s payoff (in points): __________ 
                                                 
 
 
44 The example on how to calculate the monetary payoff is shown below. 

















Participants are informed of their roles (either Player X or Player Y). 
You belong to the group of players X (or Y)! 
 
Participants get the payoff tables. 
Payoff tables are shown in Appendix B. 
 
Participants are asked to make a decision for each payoff table. 
For Player X: 
Please choose one and only one of the following options (place an “x” in the blank next 




1 Action N__________   
 
 
2 Action A __________ 
 
 




For Player Y: 
Please choose one and only one of the following options (place an “x” in the blank next 




1 Accept All Actions __________   
 
 
2 Reject Action A __________ 
 
 
3 Reject Action R __________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
